1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2	EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION
3	
4	IN RE: AUTOMOTIVE PARTS Master File No. 12-md-02311 ANTITRUST LITIGATION Hon. Marianne O. Battani
5	/ Harranne o. Baccant
6	
7	STATUS CONFERENCE / MOTION HEARINGS
8	BEFORE THE HONORABLE MARIANNE O. BATTANI
9	United States District Judge Theodore Levin United States Courthouse
10	231 West Lafayette Boulevard  Detroit, Michigan
11	Wednesday, June 4, 2014
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1
     Detroit, Michigan
 2
     Wednesday, June 4, 2014
 3
     at about 10:01 a.m.
 4
 5
                                  All rise.
               THE CASE MANAGER:
                                             Hear ye, hear ye,
 6
     hear ye.
 7
               The United States District Court for the Eastern
 8
     District of Michigan is now in session, the Honorable
 9
     Marianne O. Battani presiding. All those having business,
10
     please draw near and you shall be heard. God bless these
11
     United States and this Honorable Court.
12
               Please be seated.
13
               The Court calls Case No. Master File 12-MD-02311,
14
     In Re:
             Automotive Parts Antitrust Litigation.
15
               THE COURT: Good morning, everybody.
16
               ATTORNEYS:
                          (Collectively) Good morning.
17
               THE COURT:
                           It looks like you are all back today.
18
            Let me begin by introducing to you my new clerk.
19
     of you may not know that Bernadette Thebolt retired after
20
     40 years with the court so she is no longer with me, but my
21
     new courtroom clerk is Ms. KaMyra Doaks, and Kay is welcome.
22
                              I'm going to excuse her after this
     This is her first week.
23
     because I don't want her to quit before she knows about us.
24
               Kay is also covering -- she is with Judge
25
     Julian Cook, if any of you know Judge Cook, and he's leaving
```

```
1
     this summer some time, right?
 2
              THE CASE MANAGER: September.
 3
              THE COURT: September. So she is going to be doing
     double duty for a while, but I hope those of you who contact
 4
 5
     the Court and deal with us more directly will get to know
 6
     Kay, and I hope she will get to know and love this MDL case.
 7
            Thank you, Kay.
     Okav.
 8
              All right. Let's start with the item on the
 9
     agenda, the status of the temporary stay.
10
              We will follow the same procedure, if you would
11
     give your name before you speak, that's true of everybody.
12
              MR. WILLIAMS: Yes.
                                    Thank you, Your Honor. My
13
     name is Steve Williams. I represent the end-payor class.
14
              On this stay the DOJ's report to the Court is due
15
     on June 23rd. I don't want to speak for them, but what I did
16
     want to tell the Court is the perspective of our group and I
17
     think the other plaintiffs' groups share this, is that this
18
     stay affects a very profound and severe limitation on our
19
     ability to do any real meaningful discovery at this point.
20
              We have the ability to take depositions but we
21
     can't ask anything about substance, so therefore there is
22
     really no reason for us to do it particularly given we will
23
     have limits on how many we can take and we are not going to
24
     use our depositions now when we can't ask meaningful
25
     questions.
```

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Given what we know from DOJ's statements and quilty
pleas that secretive conduct was engaged in, code words were
used, documents were destroyed, that limitation really bars
us on the plaintiffs' side from doing anything meaningful
other than --
         THE COURT:
                    Wait a minute. You are representing
the end payors?
         MR. WILLIAMS: I represent the end payors, but I
think what I say is equally applicable to all the plaintiff
groups.
         So the point of this is just to let the Court know
from our perspective until such time as the stay is lifted,
other than the limited amount we've gotten from DOJ
productions, there is not much we can do meaningfully to
progress on our side to learn the facts of the case.
         THE COURT:
                     Is there anybody here from the DOJ?
         (No response.)
                     We tried calling them hoping to get a
         THE COURT:
little -- I guess they decided not to appear. Okay.
                                                      We will
have to wait then until we get that report on the 23rd, which
I don't know what format it will be in but I certainly would
intend on notifying all of you or dispersing it in some
fashion so that you will know -- or you may know before I
know, I don't, however these things work.
         It was entered in December, right? That was the
```

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first part of the stay was December, so this is six months
 2
           Okay. And I could appreciate, Mr. Williams, what you
 3
     said. All right.
 4
              Counsel?
 5
              MS. SULLIVAN: Your Honor, if I may respond just
 6
              My name is Marguerite Sullivan and I represent
 7
     Sumitomo defendants in the wire harness case.
              The defendants in the wire harness case disagrees
 8
 9
     completely with what Mr. Williams stated about the limits on
10
     discovery that the stay has imposed.
                                            In this case in
11
     particular the stay only bars merits depositions, that's it.
12
     So there is no limit to deposition discovery -- I'm sorry, to
13
     document discovery, there is no limit to interrogatories,
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     there are no limits to the plaintiffs' depositions, to
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     third-party discovery, to 30(b)(6) depositions of the
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     defendants, and there are a lot of issues that we can get
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     through -- a lot of discovery issues that need to be dealt
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     with during this period while the stay is in place
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     particularly class-certification-related issues which are
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     critical to this case.
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              THE COURT: Mr. Williams?
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                             Your Honor, Steve Williams again for
              MR. WILLIAMS:
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                      I have to respond to what was just said.
     the end payors.
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              To say that there is no limit other than merits
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     kind of swallows the exception. If we can't talk about
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merits what 30(b)(6) depositions of the defendants would we
have any interest in taking? We don't. The defendants
perpetrated the wrongful conduct. The defendants pled
quilty. Some of the defendants have already admitted to
destroying evidence. So to suggest we're in an ability to do
anything meaningful when we can't ask a merits question at a
deposition is not correct.
                           To suggest that we can --
         THE COURT: You need your merits depositions before
you do your class certification, is this your argument?
         MR. WILLIAMS: Of course, yeah, there is no doubt.
         THE COURT:
                     Sure.
                            Okay.
         MR. WILLIAMS: And the state of the law is to the
extent that those issues relate to the 23 questions -- the
Rule 23 questions we have to address them, and there is no
doubt in my mind at least that the defendants, when they
respond to our motion, will be raising merits questions.
of course, we need merits discovery.
                                     So it is not free and
full and fair and open at this point. Our hands are tied.
         THE COURT:
                    Okay. Your hands are tied but you have
enough to do.
         MR. WILLIAMS: We have --
         THE COURT: You have plenty to do.
         MR. WILLIAMS:
                        We have things to do but what we
can't get to is the facts of the misconduct, we are barred
from that, and that's what this case is about. So if we
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can't do that then the work we can do, and hopefully later
when we talk about coordination the Department of Justice has
agreed that there is some information they would not object
to the defendants providing us, that would be meaningful,
transactional information would be meaningful, information
about what makes and models of cars they pled guilty to
conspiring about would be meaningful, but until we can put
witnesses under oath and ask them questions about what they
did our hands really are tied because what we are limited is
looking at coded documents, wondering what's missing because
documents were destroyed, hidden or concealed.
                                                So we need to
get to the point where the stay is lifted to meaningfully
progress in terms of discovery.
         THE COURT:
                     Okay.
                        Thank you.
         MR. WILLIAMS:
         THE COURT:
                     At this point there is nothing we can
do about it.
              The DOJ will let us know when they let us know.
I mean, I wish I would have known he wasn't voluntarily
appearing, I would have subpoenaed him to appear or
something, but we will get to it June 23rd.
                Anybody else have any comment on that?
         Okay.
         (No response.)
         THE COURT:
                     Okay. I take it both sides join in
with what was said.
         All right.
                    Let's go to the next item then, and
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this is the discussion in scheduling of the end-payor plaintiffs, auto dealer plaintiffs, State of Florida and City of Richmond's motion to consolidate or coordinate all actions in the MDL.

MR. DAMRELL: Your Honor, good morning. My name is Frank Damrell on behalf of the moving plaintiffs.

The genesis of this motion really is the colloquy that you and I had at the last hearing, Your Honor, in which you instructed me to see if we could work out some type of a way to streamline the motion practice in this case with respect to the motions to dismiss, in particular regarding issues that have been resolved by the Court, and the need to continue to file briefing -- extensive briefs on those issues that you've already decided.

As a result of that colloquy, the moving plaintiffs felt that there was really more to this issue than simply the motion practice; that there was a point that we had reached in this case that we needed true coordination. That is typical of most MDLs of this complexity and size.

Your Honor, this -- the responses to this motion raise the issue of whether or not we really have an MDL in many ways because the defendants in this case would prefer to proceed with each case seriatim as if these were -- this case is lumped together. Now, I will acknowledge that I think there is some agreement here generally that would be best to

coordinate the motion practice and in dealing particularly with the motions to dismiss. I think there is an opportunity there for further agreement on that, but at present there is no such agreement and we believe that under the circumstances presently we should attempt in every way to help the Court coordinate this case among the various defendants.

The -- it could be argued I think and persuasively that this is a classic MDL. This is not a case where you have strands here and there, this is a case of components, of car-part components. And if you look at this case in terms

of an assembly line, these components would be put into this
car and ultimately the end payors or the dealers, they buy

the car, they sell the car, it is the car we are talking

about, and these are all components of the car.

Now, some defendants argue that well, this is -- in fact, we should not even consider this an MDL, that this should be somehow -- this case should be parsed among other judges or assigned to other judges, and --

THE COURT: You don't need to go there. I'm not -MR. DAMRELL: You're not persuaded by that
argument?

THE COURT: No, and I have read it and I really don't want to hear a lot of argument because I have another idea I am going to get to, I'm just going to let you argue for a couple minutes, but I am not getting rid of -- I'm not

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removing parts of this case, I could remove the whole case, that wouldn't bother me, but I am not removing parts.

MR. DAMRELL: That's understandable. I will not spend any time on that but I do think, Your Honor, it is important with respect to this case that we coordinate the And I think the notion of tranches or motion practice. grouping this is classic. We started with tracks and we started with templates, and we passed that point. We are at a point now where we need to coordinate and group the defendants in a logical fashion. And by no means am I suggesting that we have an answer to that, perhaps there is a better way to group these defendants, but in dealing with motions it seems to me that we can move this along in a way that would give the defendants their prerogatives and rights with respect to appeal and narrow the issues for the Court so that we could promptly move beyond the pleading stage and into discovery, particularly after the stay is lifted.

Your Honor, in that regard, I am -- this is a case
I have never really encountered when you have the victims,
the plaintiffs in this case, and you have those that pled
guilty, that destroyed evidence, seem to feel that there is
a -- that we are on the same -- there is a certain equanimity
here between the two parties, and there really isn't. And
the point that we would want to make is that the plaintiffs
should be allowed, and obviously hopefully with some

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     cooperation from the defendants, to group these defendants in
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     such a fashion that we can deal with issues not just with
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     respect to the motion practice but with discovery as well.
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              And in a case such as this, you know, they say this
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     is a very unusual case. Well, it is an unusual case.
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     unusual because there are so many defendants.
                                                     It is unusual
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     because all the defendants pled quilty. But let's think
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     about that because by pleading guilty there was no hearing,
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     there was no trial, there was no -- we --
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               THE COURT: We don't want to stay all of the
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     defendants.
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               MR. DAMRELL: Virtually all.
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               THE COURT: That's not as I read the briefs.
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               DEFENSE ATTORNEYS:
                                   (Collectively) No.
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               THE COURT:
                           Okay.
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               MR. DAMRELL: Virtually all?
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               DEFENSE ATTORNEYS:
                                   (Collectively) No.
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               THE COURT:
                          No.
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               MR. DAMRELL: How about 29, 29?
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              MR. TUBACH: We are ready to render a verdict, Your
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     Honor.
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              MR. DAMRELL:
                             These are all the good guys, Your
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             Look at the point being there were multiple --
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               THE COURT: Of 90-some defendants we could say a
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     few or some.
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MR. DAMRELL:
                            Well, it was my understanding that
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     there were 29 defendants I believe that entered pleas of
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     quilty. Fair enough.
                            That's a lot of defendants.
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              Nevertheless, in terms of what they know is
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     something that we have no idea of in terms of the plaintiffs.
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     We don't know what they know. We don't have any idea what
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     this conspiracy consisted of.
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              And in terms of the destruction of evidence that is
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     also a grave concern and Mr. Williams has already commented
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     on that.
               The point I'm trying to make here --
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              THE COURT: Basically -- Mr. Damrell, excuse me for
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     interrupting but we need to move this along. We are really
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     looking for a procedure to better coordinate what is going on
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     here and to move the case as efficiently as we can.
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     that -- that's basically what you are --
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              MR. DAMRELL: And we have submitted such a
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     procedure, Your Honor.
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                           I understand that. Okay.
              THE COURT:
                                                      I have read
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     it, and I think that's enough argument for right now because
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     I'm going to discuss something in just a minute. Let me hear
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     the defense argument.
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              MR. DAMRELL: Could I ask, Mr. Williams, he was
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     going to take part of my time so if he could do that now that
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     may be helpful?
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              THE COURT:
                          It doesn't look like it is
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     Mr. Williams.
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              MR. WILLIAMS: Mr. Barrett.
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              MR. BARRETT: Just briefly, Your Honor?
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              THE COURT:
                         Okay.
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              MR. BARRETT: Your Honor, I'm Don Barrett, one of
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     the co-leads for the auto dealers.
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              There is another facet to this motion to
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     coordinate, and that's the discovery coordination. It would
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     be terribly inappropriate to depose the class representatives
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     now as some of the defendants are insisting. Our clients
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     would be blindsided if they are forced to give depositions
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     before they know the facts of the conspiracy, and we, that is
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     their lawyers, can adequately advise them. We are stayed
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     as --
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              THE COURT: How would they be blindsided?
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              MR. BARRETT: Well, we don't know much about the
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     conspiracy except what we read in the paper. We don't know
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     what the parts are involved. We don't know what the -- we
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     don't even know all of the car models or even all of the
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     makes that are involved.
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              We are stayed, as Mr. Williams said, from effective
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     discovery but they are not. They know what they did, and
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     they have -- they would have an enormous advantage over us if
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     they were able to take advantage of the -- of their knowledge
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     of the criminal acts that they have committed. We don't know
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what prices were fixed on all models, we don't know by how much as yet, so it would be grossly prejudicial to our clients who really are honest businessmen and consumers to be prematurely forced into depositions.

Your Honor, there is another thing. There is nothing that these plaintiffs right now could really add.

There is no reason to take their depositions. All they need from the auto dealers are their acquisition data. We have been giving them -- we've given them hundreds of thousands of pages and we are continuing to do that.

And they don't want to take one deposition, they are insisting on taking 20 or 30 depositions of each car dealer, for example, and, Your Honor, that's a -- it is an abusive idea that they have. The whole point of it is to take a useless, repetitive, abusive and premature set of depositions hoping to harass these businessmen out of this litigation. It is the world turned upside down, Your Honor.

These defendant corporations, if they were flesh-and-blood people and standing before you today they would have on orange jumpsuits and leg shackles. They are entitled to a fair procedure and they are entitled to a fair trial, but they are not entitled to have priority over their victims in discovery.

THE COURT: Do you have motions now to take the depositions of 20 some people in your dealerships? Are those

filed?

MR. BARRETT: No, but that has been discussed, that is what they are insisting on in their -- in their motion concerning the wire harness, the protocol.

THE COURT: Okay. Defendants?

MS. SULLIVAN: Marguerite Sullivan on behalf of the Sumitomo defendants. I will be speaking on behalf of the wire harness defendants only. I understand that there are some other lawyers in the room that would like to speak on behalf of other defendants in the larger MDL.

Just to set the stage here, this is not a classic MDL. A classic MDL is the wire harness MDL where there were 17 cases filed by multiple different classes all over the country. Those cases went before the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation and the JPML transferred them all to Your Honor and formed an MDL called the wire harness MDL originally. That is a classic MDL.

This is a completely different animal because what happened here was that you had the wire harness MDL transferred to Your Honor, and then the JPML considered the HCP case, the fuel sender case and the instrument panel cluster case to be sufficiently related such that they should also get transferred to Your Honor.

And then the plaintiffs filed 25 other cases in this court and those were joined with this case, but those 25

other cases are completely different cases. There are 36 defendant families, and I know the number is much higher when you look at individual defendants, and 26 of those defendant families are only in one product category case, they are not across the board in all of these cases. So that's an important thing to understand. This is not a classic MDL.

Second, we hear a lot both in the briefing and in the argument that we just heard about the victims, the indirect purchasers are who are calling themselves victims, and they claim that their rights trump the defendants' rights, but they are assuming that they have proved their case already, Your Honor, and they haven't done that. They have a long way to go before they do that.

As you know, they have pled in their complaints that there were conspiracies -- I'm going to talk specifically about the wire harness complaints, but they claim that there was a conspiracy that related to RFQs issued by OEMs, auto manufacturers. These indirect purchasers are not auto manufacturers admittedly. So what they have to prove to establish their claims, to establish that they were victims, is that they paid more for the cars that they purchased because of an overcharge that was charged to the OEMs.

Your Honor noted in the -- in your ruling on the defendants' motion to dismiss that that might be difficult

for them to do, and we agree, we don't think they are going to be able to do it, but that's not really the focus of today's discussion. My point is just that plaintiffs' counsels' outrage at the fact that the defendants in this case would actually want to defend ourself are totally unwarranted because they haven't yet proven their case, and that's what brings me to the crux of the defendants' opposition to their motion to coordinate.

that we can prove to Your Honor that the conspiracy in the wire harness industry was not nearly as broad as plaintiffs claim that it is. We want to prove to Your Honor that they were not victims and that they were not impacted by the defendants' conduct, but they want to push everything off. They don't want us to get there. They want to push off the plaintiffs' depositions indefinitely so we can't even figure out exactly what the plaintiffs' purchased or from whom or how they set the price of the cars that they purchased, whether they negotiated them. We don't get to ask any of those questions until some other point in time until after the plaintiffs have progressed in these other 28 product cases that are completely unrelated to our case.

They want to push off some of the defendants' depositions indefinitely, again, while they learn about unrelated conduct with respect to unrelated products. And

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they want to delay a determination on --THE COURT: What about the merits deposition in the wire harness case? The merits depositions are stayed MS. SULLIVAN: for the moment, that's true. As I indicated earlier, there is a lot of discovery related to class certification, which is a huge issue for the plaintiffs in this case, which, of course, they want to push off until some later date again undetermined. But merits depositions will occur as soon as the I don't know for sure but I would expect DOJ stay lifts. that the DOJ's stay related to wire harness would lift before some of the other products. The stay currently is different for the products. The first four cases only have a stay in place related to merits depositions, but all other discovery The other 25 cases behind the first four have a can proceed. more broad stay. So the DOJ is not treating these product cases similarly even with respect to the stay. THE COURT: But you agree they need the merits deposition -- excuse me, they need to be able to get to the

merits before we can really get into the class certification?

MS. SULLIVAN: They do, they do. And as we discussed the last time that we debated the schedule for class certification, the defendants proposed that we schedule class certification briefing originally for 180 days after

the DOJ stay lifted in the wire harness case for that precise reason. But it is not true that they can't proceed with their case or that they can't develop their class certification theories. I mean, they need to know, for example, the procurement practices of the OEMs and the process that each defendant went through when it responded to an RFQ. How do we set the prices for the wire harness generally? That has nothing to do with conspiratorial conduct. It is 30(b)(6) testimony that they can obtain now. And, you know, the representation that they can't proceed with their case, they can't develop their case, is just not true.

This happens all the time, by the way. There are other examples of cases where there has been a DOJ stay on merits discovery and tons of discovery has occurred during that stay while the stay is in place.

I will address specifically the plaintiffs' depositions because it's -- we are willing -- the defendants are willing to use our best efforts to try to avoid duplication. It is not true that we are insisting on 20 some odd depositions of each of these individual plaintiffs. We have not made that statement. In fact, we said the opposite, we said that we will work with the plaintiffs to try to avoid duplication and that we may be able to accomplish it to some extent. For example, the wire harness defendants I imagine

could probably cover together with the HCP defendants, the fuel sender defendants, the instrument panel cluster defendants, they could probably cover all of those products when they are asking questions at the plaintiffs' depositions.

And to the extent that there are other defendants that are in a position to examine plaintiffs now, there is no reason why that couldn't happen, but to mandate that there can only be one deposition of each of these plaintiffs across all 29 product cases would be, A, logistically impossible I think because you've got defendants in some of the later cases that, A, have not even been served, and then, B, even when they have been served the logistics of organizing and coordinating these depositions would be extremely difficult, but putting that aside the more important point is that it would delay the wire harness case significantly.

We expect that the depositions of the plaintiffs will enable us to prove that some plaintiffs did not purchase price-fixed wire harnesses at all or cars containing price-fixed wire harnesses, and we expect that we'll be able to eliminate plaintiffs' claims on other grounds as well without getting into the weeds of all of that now, but they are suggesting that we wait for years before we can depose these people.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

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MS. SULLIVAN: Your Honor, I will add just before I sit down, there are other ways where we think we can avoid duplication and streamline discovery, third-party discovery We are using our best efforts to avoid is one way. duplicative discovery of -- or depositions of defendants is So there are many ways we can do this, they another way. just didn't give us an opportunity to work it out with them. THE COURT: I am a little bit curious as to your recommendation, of course, you're only wire harness so I don't know, but your recommendation that other parts go to other judges. MS. SULLIVAN: Oh, that's not my motion. MR. KESSLER: Your Honor, good morning. I'm Jeffery Kessler from Winston & Strawn. I'm here speaking on behalf of the 18 defendants who have filed what we have called the deferred defendants' brief. I like that name, deferred defendants. We consist of 12 corporate families MR. KESSLER: involving 13 different product categories. My individual clients in that group are Panasonic Corporation and Panasonic North America. Your Honor, I heard you loud and clear about your reaction to our request for relief, so what I would like to do is spend a little time explaining the problem we see and

then maybe the Court has ideas on a solution if you don't

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     like the solution we propose, but the problem is overwhelming
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     and severe.
              We all agree --
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              THE COURT: So how many judges were you thinking
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     this should be sent out to?
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                            Your Honor, we were going to leave it
              MR. KESSLER:
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     to the fair decision making of this courthouse perhaps in
     consultation with the chief judge here.
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              Let me explain how this has been done when this has
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     come up before and the problem, if I may.
                                                 I think the
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     plaintiffs, the defendants, the Court, everyone agrees the
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     purpose of this proceeding under the federal rules and the
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     MDL rules is to have a fair and efficient proceeding. No one
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     could dispute that.
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              The problem we have, and it is nobody's fault, it's
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     least of all the Court's fault, it is nobody's fault that the
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     proceedings at the moment are neither fair nor efficient for
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     most of the defendants in this case, and the reason --
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              THE COURT:
                          What do you mean, they are not fair?
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                             I will explain that, Your Honor.
              MR. KESSLER:
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              The reason for that is because when the MDL panel
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     originally ruled there were four product categories that it
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                  There are now 29 product categories.
     considered.
     about six or seven cases at that time. There are now almost
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     100 cases -- I just counted and I believe it is 98, Your
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Honor, we are about to get to 100. And very, very importantly, Your Honor, there is no end in sight. Department of Justice has made it --I wish you wouldn't say it like that. THE COURT: MR. KESSLER: But, Your Honor, that's the reality we have to face. The DOJ has made it clear that there are many investigations continuing. We have to expect, and I'm not exaggerating, there are going to be dozens more cases filed over the next year or two involving numerous new product categories, involving defendants who are currently not in the MDL. The fire marshal is going to eventually have to put a restriction on the number of lawyers who can come into this courtroom, so this is unprecedented. And in that regard, there has -- what has happened, why do we call ourselves the deferred defendants? Because the deferred defendants have not yet even had an amended complaint because I don't know what the charges are against They are under a permanent cloud, that indefinite cloud of litigation. By the way, most of the deferred defendants have not pled guilty, which is why you heard the uproar about

So the unfairness is while the federal rules say you get an efficient, fair proceeding, they are in limbo not knowing the charges against them in this litigation, watching other cases go by that have no connection to them. And this is what I will call the myths that plaintiffs have perpetuated in the MDL.

Myth number one is these cases are related because they are auto parts. In point of fact, many of these defendants are in one product, don't know these other companies, are not alleged ever to have met and spoken to them let alone be in any common set of facts with them, completely unrelated claims of conspiracy, unrelated defendants in most cases. The initial cases had a couple overlapping defendants, most of the cases have no overlapping defendants. It is interesting in the case that I have for Panasonic Corporation we are the only defendant so far, no one else has even been joined; presumably when they amend the complaint some day we will know who they claim we conspired with. So they are not related.

Second is the MDL order required all of this. Your Honor, that's completely untrue. In fact, if this was an MDL proceeding for all of these cases they would have tagged -- it's called tagging each of these other cases, the 80 cases that have come since the original MDL, as an MDL case, they would have gone to the proceedings where you get to object if

you want to to the MDL panel and say no, this doesn't belong in this MDL, and the panel decides. They avoided all of that. What they did was they filed all the other cases after the original four in this court, in the Eastern District of Michigan, and they just said oh, it is all related to the auto parts MDL, let's get here, so it has never gone through the MDL process, it is not required by the MDL rules, so that's a myth.

The next thing is the myth that somehow by putting us all here there is going to be a global settlement as if this was one conspiracy. Let's be very clear, no complaint alleges one conspiracy. No department plea agreement alleges one conspiracy. No foreign proceeding alleges one conspiracy. Each of the settlements that have been presented so far are not of one conspiracy, it is an individual defendant about an individual part separately, so none of the ideas that you normally have in an MDL that if you get everybody together maybe they all can settle together, it is impossible in this case, there is no prospect of it, it will never happen, and yet the cases keep coming through the door and they are going to keep coming through the door with no end in sight.

The next myth about this, that somehow there are many efficiencies going on here. Why are there not many efficiencies? The reason is if you are in different parts

the discovery is about different parts, they don't overlap.

Different companies are involved. Different defendant
witnesses are involved, not the same ones in most cases. If
you are certifying a class, for example, at the direct level
you are -- their expert will have to do a separate
predominance analysis of each part separately with different
regressions, with different studies. There's no overlap in
the direct purchaser certification. There's going to be no
efficiency there at all.

The only overlap, which is why they raise this
issue, is that for the plaintiffs' depositions they chose to
have the same class representatives in these 98 cases. Now,
that wasn't our fault. The classes are big. They could have

issue, is that for the plaintiffs' depositions they chose to have the same class representatives in these 98 cases. Now, that wasn't our fault. The classes are big. They could have chosen different class representatives for each case, but their complaint is, well, we decide and then we hear that the poor auto dealer who chose to be a plaintiff in 30, 40 different cases says I don't want to be deposed in those cases when they can't be the class representative. It is very simple. No one forces anyone to be a class representative. When you step up — how do you know they are an adequate class representative? How do you get discovery?

So the efficiency issue is really all on their side because they picked the same plaintiffs. Now, we are willing to work on that, Your Honor. We are not saying that a plaintiff, even though they submitted to this, should be

deposed 50 times, but they also have to be deposed and it is going to be more than once because it is impossible unless you are going to say now, Your Honor, these cases are stayed, all of them until the Department of Justice is finished, which may be three, four years from now, and we see how many hundreds of cases we are up to then, and I would say, Your Honor, that would be neither efficient nor fair to anyone. Unless you are going to do that, these cases have to move forward in some way. People have a right to do that.

So the question becomes what is the answer? Now, we came up with one answer which Your Honor doesn't like. The answer, we said the number and diversity of these cases is so much that no one judge, the finest judge in the country, couldn't possibly have the time to give the consideration to all of these 40 different -- no, it is going to be 80 different class certification motions and growing, each one having to be separately situated, hundreds, if not thousands, of discovery disputes. It's just not feasible.

And the MDL rules themselves say, even if it is an MDL, right in the decisions they talk about in some cases it is appropriate to avoid -- to involve multiple judges because the workload is simply too great. Certainly this district's local rules would allow there to be coordination. We are not trying to get rid of coordination, we are quite confident that you and several colleagues could come up with a plan to

coordinate where was there, but our concern is -- and we are open to any other solution obviously Your Honor comes up with. Unless we get a solution we have clients sitting there saying when will this case move? When do we get to -- we didn't plead guilty, when do we get to clear our name? When do we get what Rule 23 says, which is to decide class certification as soon as practicable?

What the plaintiffs want to do is keep this indefinitely for very obvious reasons; they would like to frighten defendants whether they are guilty or not, whether there's merits or not, whether they are victims or not, to settle these cases, and I'm sure some companies will settle these cases but most will not, and there will never be a global settlement, and the problem is we have to find a solution, so, Your Honor, I obviously have great respect, if you don't like our idea it is there, but we need a solution for all of these deferred defendants.

THE COURT: At this point we know that we need to be done with the DOJ investigation or we have to do something with the DOJ to say this is the cutoff and discovery is going to be allowed.

MR. KESSLER: Your Honor doesn't have to grant their request for a stay, that's Your Honor's decision. At some point these cases have to move forward, but my point is even if the DOJ ended their stay today there is a problem of

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more and more cases coming, and they are going to come.
this problem -- right now, so under the plaintiffs' proposal
my defendant, Panasonic, would get an amended complaint for
the first time about a year from now, and that's only if Your
Honor raced like a clock and was issuing these decisions
constantly ahead of us, and that's not fair to the Court,
these are important issues. You know, I don't know how to
get there.
         So under their schedule, which I think no judge
could follow, a year from now we first get our amended
complaint and start thinking about what the charges are
against us and what's there. That's not the American justice
system.
         It is not what MDLs are designed to do.
         So, Your Honor, I'm going to sit down unless you
have questions for me but that's why with all due respect we
suggested the idea that it is appropriate to sit down and
find a unique way envisioned by the rules to get additional
judicial resources so that all of the defendants and the
plaintiffs can get their fair and efficient day in court.
         THE COURT: All right.
         MR. KESSLER: Thank you, Your Honor.
         THE COURT:
                     Thank you.
                       Your Honor, I know -- I'm sorry.
         MR. WILLIAMS:
Steve Williams for the end payors and the moving plaintiffs.
         I know you said that you had a thought, and I'm
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sure we all want to hear it, but I want to respond to some of the things that were just said because I don't think they fairly or accurately describe what's going on here.

First, I don't know where the idea about amended complaints a year from now came from, certainly I don't think we said it, but to satisfy those defendants you will have ours next week.

Service. We served everyone, everyone in all of our cases except one of those defendants who pled guilty but refuses to accept service even though they could and insist we go through the Hague process.

The argument you chose to be a plaintiff, we didn't choose that, but you refuse to be deposed. We didn't say that. What we are saying is I bought a car and the facts about me buying a car are the same whether the attorney in the first case asks it or the attorney in the last case asks it. There's no difference. However, they did choose to conspire, that was their choice.

Now, there is a lot of uproar about how many defendants pled guilty but the fact is, and I don't think they are going to deny this, 36 corporate families, 27 guilty pleas. So I don't think we have to fight about that. We know that most of them did this. Those that didn't plead guilty here, most were fined by another jurisdiction, some are applicants so therefore they don't plead guilty.

about we don't know what they are charging us with, it is not fair to us, we have to wait. I agree with a lot of what Ms. Sullivan said. Both of us -- both sides deserve a fair opportunity, for us to try to prove our claims and for them to assert whatever defenses they have, but when you listen to the argument that says -- and there was an irony in the way it was presented because they said well, the plaintiffs assume that they were victims and that they've won. We don't assume we've won but we assume that when the Attorney General and the Assistant Deputy Attorney General running the investigation say American consumers and businesses paid more for their cars, that they know what they are talking about and that we deserve an opportunity to try to prove that, both of us fairly, not tilted one way or the other.

So I want to focus on a few things because they are getting lost here. Number one, it is an MDL. The common core of it, the conduct all of them are alleged to have engaged in, and that 27 of those corporate families pled guilty to, putting aside the destruction of evidence and the obstruction of justice, is fixing the prices of component parts of cars, and we allege they did it the same way. So that's the common core and that's what an MDL is about.

So as the Court is all too familiar, when you get the motion to dismiss in case five it says the same things

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     that the motion to dismiss in case one said, and that's why
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     you have an MDL, so you can have common rulings on those
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     issues that don't deviate. That's why we are here.
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              And there are a few key things. We talked about
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     third parties. For the indirect purchasers in particular we
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     need third-party discovery in order to certify our classes.
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              THE COURT:
                           We are not there yet.
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              MR. WILLIAMS: I understand, but there is a
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     critical point here because what you heard the wire harness
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     defendants say, we can do that, we've got to go get this
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     third-party discovery. We can't go to them 29 times.
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     indirect purchasers, we can only go to them once because,
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     Your Honor, if Toyota came before you and said this is my
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     fifth subpoena now, this is unfair, I'm a third party, you
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     can't keep subjecting me to this, they would have a pretty
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     good argument. We are entitled to have this on the table so
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     we can go to them once, jointly if we have to with
     defendants, and we will try to work with them because we want
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     the information, they want the information, but we can't go
     to them 29 times.
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              THE COURT:
                           Okay.
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              MR. WILLIAMS:
                              Thank you.
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              THE COURT:
                           That's kind of what I want to talk
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     about here because as I read the motion I realize that before
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     this case does get out of hand, and it's not there yet but if
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the DOJ drops ten more parts tomorrow and we have more cases, I mean, it could be —— it could be quite the challenge. I think what we need, and I have hesitated to do this in the past and you know that, but I do think now we need —— I'm calling it a facilitator. We need some person who is going to be a discovery—scheduling facilitator, administrator, who needs to be a neutral person who can go to both sides, see all of these issues that you are talking about with the discovery and who are the main third parties, for instance, that are going to be deposed and arrange some kind of coordination. I can't do that for you, and I think that somebody needs to do that.

I don't know who that person will be. It needs to be an outside person, not somebody within our court, because I have nobody here, a magistrate judge, anybody else, who can devote full time, and I see this as a very major job for a period of time.

What I would like, I want to hear -- I want to hear your comments about this, and it's really not open for yes or no, I want to hear what you feel this person could best do, and I want you to be in a position to submit names to me. I want somebody you are all satisfied with, and maybe you could prescribe a process with this selection. I plan based on written submissions to make the selection in the end myself from these people.

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Comments?
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               (No response.)
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               THE COURT: No comments.
                                         Okay.
               MR. KESSLER: I have a question, Your Honor?
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               THE COURT:
                           Yes.
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               MR. KESSLER: Would this person in effect be
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     appointed a special master by the Court in effect under
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     Rule 53, is that the Court's idea?
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                           I think it would have to be under
               THE COURT:
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     Rule 53.
               I don't know how --
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                             I think where this has been used in
               MR. KESSLER:
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     other MDLs I think that's the procedure that has been
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     followed, and then it becomes a designation under Rule 53 as
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     to what you are delegating and it can be appealed up, Your
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             I'm just asking if that's the procedure the Court is
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     envisioning?
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               THE COURT: Yes, I guess is the answer to that
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     question.
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               MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, Steve Williams for the
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     end payors.
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               This is something we have all discussed on our
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     side, and in a number of the electronic cases that the
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     defendants frequently refer to in the northern district we
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     have used this type procedure, someone who the parties agree
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     on or the Court selects who can devote time to issue reports
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and recommendations to the Court on issues that come up. I think the idea makes sense and it then would be up to us to confer and see what we can propose to you in the submissions. THE COURT: I want to make clear that the magistrate judge, and I see Magistrate Judge Majzoub is here, may very well still get the discovery disputes but, of course, we are not talking about -- I don't know, Magistrate Judge Majzoub, if you were here when you heard them talk about thousands of disputes. That word thousands is scary. I don't know if it will become necessary to even add to this a second person, but I really am looking for to start with a person who is -- who knows this business, perhaps somebody who knows the auto business would be really nice, but who is a great administrator because this needs administration and facilitation. I am not so worried about how to resolve a discovery dispute because certainly I could do it, our magistrate judge could do it. It is just the volume that may

I am not so worried about how to resolve a discovery dispute because certainly I could do it, our magistrate judge could do it. It is just the volume that may lead us out to somebody else to do it, but in terms of the administration that requires somebody with special skills and somebody who can be fair to both sides, and needs to have a good grasp of what is going on here.

Somebody else wanted to --

MR. HANSEL: Good morning, Your Honor. Greg Hansel for the direct-purchaser plaintiffs. May it please the

Court, just a few comments on the suggestion of a facilitator.

Honor would like to appoint someone in that capacity. And, of course, the direct purchasers will be happy to work with the defendants, the other plaintiffs, the different plaintiff groups, to see if we can reach an agreement on someone who meets the criteria that Your Honor just put forward; a strong administrator, perhaps someone even with a background in the automotive industry, someone who could help, for lack of a better word, coordinate and ride herd over a lot of the administrative details in this case.

To date the parties have done a lot of that on their own, and not --

THE COURT: Yes, you have.

MR. HANSEL: -- notwithstanding, you know, the concerns that have been raised today, I will say we are sort of proud we have reached agreement on a lot of the agreed orders, it has taken months and months sometimes but we have reached agreements on a lot of agreed orders, stipulations that I think have smoothed the process so far. And I must --

THE COURT: Well, let me interrupt you there, because I don't mean in any way by this suggestion to denigrate what you've done. You have worked amazingly well together, I certainly recognize that, my staff recognizes it.

I just see as we go into the discovery we need protocol, we need coordination, and it's something that you need somebody who is independent of both sides to say this is the way it should be.

MR. HANSEL: That makes a lot of sense, Your Honor. Two more comments. Direct purchasers disagree with Panasonic's assessment that the sky is falling in this case. We think the case is going smoothly and will continue to go smoothly, and we think it is manageable.

One of the core principles of that is that it is

Your Honor who is the ultimate decisionmaker on issues of

merits, and we do not understand that Your Honor is proposing

that a special master or facilitator would start making

merits determinations. We think that the Court's ultimate

authority here is really what drives agreements that are made

in the conferences that we have in between these status

conferences, the conferences among the parties. Thank you.

THE COURT: I'm not advocating any authority.

Okay. Let's just say I would like you to meet and confer, to come up with suggestions and a proposed order appointing under Rule 53 a master who will coordinate and develop protocol for discovery and other administrative matters as they arise. However that's worded, I want it clear that I have the final say-so -- and what I have the final say-so and what matters that you will deem this person, whatever we call

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him.
      I hate to call him a master, I don't know why I don't
like that word, facilitator or administrator, you know, what
his or her duties will be and what he or she has the final
say-so.
         I'm going to ask that the attorneys, perhaps
through your lead attorneys, with the defendants -- the
problem is with so many defendants we don't have a
defendants' group so anybody who wants to participate will,
of course, be able to participate.
         MR. WILLIAMS:
                        I wanted to make a point on what
Your Honor just said. We need a defense liaison.
customary in these cases to have one.
         THE COURT: Yes.
         MR. WILLIAMS: And throughout the course of this we
have worked well and people have acted in that role, but we
don't have somebody designated to be the point person, and we
need that.
                     Defendants are shaking their heads.
         THE COURT:
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MS. SULLIVAN: Well, Your Honor, just as the plaintiffs have multiple liaison counsel, I think that the defendants' side could probably work together to identify multiple liaison counsel but I don't think it is possible to have one lawyer representing all of the defendants in all separate and unrelated 29 product cases.

THE COURT: I don't think it is possible either but

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it would be nice if you got together and formed some kind of
a group amongst you less than all the defendants, but even
that I am not so concerned with right now. I want to get
this other person in line, and I think these things will
naturally develop from that. So I am interested in doing
this relatively quickly, I do not want to delay in this
matter for something like this. I'm going to ask -- do you
think two weeks is sufficient time for you to do that, at
least to the point of suggesting names to me?
         MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, for plaintiffs.
         THE COURT: Defense?
         MS. SULLIVAN: Yes, Your Honor.
         THE COURT: Anybody else on the defense want to
speak?
         (No response.)
         THE COURT: Okay. Let's do that. Let me -- I will
tell you what, today is the 4th, Wednesday, let me ask you to
submit something in writing by Friday, the 20th.
         There also, of course, would have to be provisions
              I know that you all know more about that than I
for payment.
do so however this is to be paid amongst all parties. Okay.
         MR. WILLIAMS: Steve Williams again.
         There is an issue a little bit later in the agenda
but I think it is part of this issue. In the wire harness
case there was an item for a deposition protocol, and all of
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the issues we've been talking about from the plaintiffs' side
are within there, the coordination, the need to avoid
duplication.
              We think that the better course is not to have
that deadline but to have that worked out with whoever is
chosen under Rule 53.
         THE COURT: Oh, no, definitely, that deposition
protocol will be worked out with whoever this person is.
                                                          No,
that's one of the reasons why I took this route actually.
         MR. WILLIAMS:
                        Thank you.
                            Any other comments?
         THE COURT: Okay.
         (No response.)
         THE COURT: All right. Going on in our agenda, the
status of the settlements?
         MR. BARRETT: Don Barrett again, and Warren Burns.
         Over the last year or so, Your Honor, the auto
dealers' and the end-payors' counsel have worked closely
together in most areas of the litigation but especially in
                         This has really facilitated
settlement discussions.
settlement negotiations at least with those defendants who
have had enough sense to sit down and talk with us.
         We've previously announced a settlement to Your
Honor with Nippon Seiki a couple of status conferences ago.
Today we are pleased to announce four new settlements with
Lear, with AutoLiv, with TRW and with Yazaki. Your Honor, we
are not free yet for the next few days to disclose the
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amounts of all of these settlements but I will say that the numbers are quite substantial and they are going to make the class members, and we certainly hope the Court, very, very pleased.

We would note that in settling with Yazaki in particular that this is a major accomplishment in light of Yazaki's significance as a large supplier of wire harnesses. We think that this litigation is headed in the right direction, Your Honor. Mr. Kessler is just wrong; of course there is an end in sight to this litigation.

MR. BURNS: Warren Burns with Susman Godfrey for the end payors.

Mr. Williams, my co-counsel, alluded to this earlier, a few weeks ago Deputy Attorney General

Bruce Schneier noted in an interview that it is a very, very safe assumption that U.S. consumers paid more, and sometimes significantly more, for their automobiles as a result of this conspiracy.

We are not in a position to announce amounts and we won't get into that here, but I think it is a very, very safe assumption that this is a significant step forward in this litigation, and particularly it is a significant step forward to make sure that the victims of this conspiracy, American consumers and automobile dealers, are compensated for their damages.

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I would add one final thing. The settlements also include robust cooperation clauses from each of the defendants we have settled with today, and we certainly took that into account as we were negotiating with them in valuing these settlements. I think it is also a very safe assumption, Your Honor, that as we are forced further and further down this litigation road that the way we view cooperation and the way we assess and value that in the context of successive negotiations and settlements will change, and we hope the defendants will recognize that simple fact. THE COURT: I do have one question on -- AutoLiv was the one that I knew about that came in. Are you ready yet for me to set dates for you to have a preliminary hearing? MR. BARRETT: Yes, ma'am. We were talking about -that was what I was going to bring up. We would hope that -and we have not talked to all of the defendants about this but we have just -- we are hoping that the Court could set the preliminary approval hearings for all of these four on one day, July 14th, 15th, 16th preferably, maybe the 17th as If the Court -an alternate.

THE COURT: Well, I'm looking at the schedule and July 14th is a Saturday. I love you but I'm not coming in.

MR. BARRETT: I don't mean for it to be.

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THE COURT:
                           The 16th is a Monday, the 17th is a
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     Tuesday.
               How long --
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              MR. BARRETT: July 14th is a Monday.
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              THE COURT: I'm sorry, I'm in June. Let me get
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     into July. I'm trying to push you a little faster.
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              Do you think that an hour and-a-half, two hours, if
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     there are four of them?
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              MR. BARRETT: A couple hours.
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              THE COURT:
                           Okay.
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              MR. BURNS:
                          Your Honor, we will confer with each of
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     the defendants on those dates if that week looks generally
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     open to y'all -- or to the Court?
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              THE COURT:
                           I will tell you what, it is not
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     generally open, but I will give you any of those days in the
15
     afternoon and I will move what I have so that you can
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     coordinate that.
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              MR. BARRETT:
                            Thank you, Your Honor. We will be
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     back to the Court seasonably on that.
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              THE COURT:
                          All right.
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              MR. KANNER: Good morning, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Good morning -- after -- no, it is
22
     still morning.
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              MR. KANNER:
                            Is it still morning? It is, indeed.
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     Steve Kanner on behalf of the direct-purchaser class.
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              I can only make a comment that, borrowing a little
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bit from Mark Twain, that the reports of the apocalypse in this courtroom are somewhat exaggerated and premature.

I would like to report on three items this morning by way of status and in terms of new developments.

The first is the instrument panel cluster, which the Court heard us talk about on the 15th of May. We are currently awaiting the customer information from the defendants which is produced -- is to be produced within 60 days of our hearing for preliminary approval, which was May 16th. The hearing for final approval is set for November 5th, and we will come back to that in a moment.

The second matter is the settlement with Lear which, as you know, we introduced to this Court some time ago. And that settlement, of course, had a wrinkle in the sense that it had to be approved by the bankruptcy court before we could move for preliminary approval here.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. KANNER: That approval took place in the Southern District of New York by Judge Groper on May 27th. The appeal period on that order expires on June 10th. We would expect to file our motion for preliminary approval on June 11th. Obviously we could have a hearing on preliminary approval 18 or 19 days thereafter, and so certainly there is an opportunity to coordinate this so that Your Honor can hear multiple hearings on the same day, and we are open to trying

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to do that to maximize the efficiency of this Court.
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              As I also understand it, Your Honor entered an
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     order on the stipulation with the defendants to produce the
     customer lists for purposes of notice within 60 days.
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              THE COURT:
                           I think that was just entered
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     yesterday?
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              MR. KANNER: It was, indeed, so that's in motion,
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     and the subsequent dates for the summary notice and the
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     related stips will, of course, be dependent on this Court's
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     ruling on the motion for preliminary approval, so it is
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     hard to -- I don't want to put the cart before the horse, but
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     we would certainly be eager to have that motion for
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     preliminary approval heard at the Court's earliest
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     convenience within that time period, 18 or so days from
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     June 11th, which puts us into that category that my
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     colleagues from --
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              THE COURT:
                          That July date you might get in on the
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     same --
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              MR. KANNER: I don't see any reason why we
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     couldn't, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT:
                           Okay.
22
                           And if experience is a factor over
              MR. KANNER:
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     here, the hearing on the motion for preliminary approval for
     Nippon Seiki, of course in the absence of any objections, and
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     that's the only but-for over here, didn't take much more than
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a half hour.

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THE COURT: Right. Why don't you coordinate that with them and talk to my staff? I suggest you contact Molly Roehrig up here -- Molly, I think they know you -- to set this up, and then she will deal with Kay Doaks since she is new to make sure we have the time and rearrange the schedule to accommodate that.

MR. KANNER: Certainly.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KANNER: The third item, Your Honor, of course I think my colleagues for the end purchasers and auto dealers alluded to, and that relates to the settlement which was filed before Your Honor yesterday on the AutoLiv matter with the direct-purchaser plaintiffs. It is a substantial settlement, I won't go into discussing it because it has just been filed before the Court, and those discussions which we would like to have are more suitable for the hearing on preliminary approval. That can also take place anytime two and-a-half weeks from today. If Your Honor would be disposed to couple that with those -- with the motions referred to by the other plaintiffs, we can do that, otherwise we are prepared to move for preliminary -- to hear preliminary approval anytime this Court would give us a date, which we could do frankly in two and-a-half weeks, we can still do that third week of June if Your Honor is inclined to have

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     that hearing.
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               THE COURT:
                           We could do that but I think it might
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     be better just to do them all on the same date just for our
     coordination.
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               MR. KANNER: Certainly, Your Honor.
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                           If we need more time, you know, instead
               THE COURT:
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     of starting at 2:00 we can do 1:00 to 5:00 or 1:00 to 4:00 so
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     that we can get them all in.
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               MR. KANNER: That's fine, Your Honor. Our interest
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     is to maximize the efficiencies over here.
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               THE COURT:
                           Okay.
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                            There currently under discussion with
               MR. KANNER:
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     defense counsel on that AutoLiv settlement is a production of
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     the customer lists because, of course, that's a requirement
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     for us to send out notice, and I hope to be able to report to
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     this Court shortly that we have reached an agreement and that
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     those will be presented in due course.
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               A final matter on this, Your Honor, and it tends to
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     bleed into the arguments on the motions to dismiss for the
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     OSS case. Counsel for AutoLiv will represent to the Court
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     certainly that their involvement in the motion to dismiss
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     will be altered as a result of the settlement.
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               THE COURT:
                           Okay.
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               MR. KANNER: Thank you very much.
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               THE COURT:
                           Thank you very much, Mr. Kanner.
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     Counsel?
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              MR. SANDERS: Your Honor, this is Parker Sanders,
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     I'm counsel for Kyungshin-Lear Sales and Engineering Sales.
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              We heard just for a moment about the date in July.
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     I just want to go ahead and mention I have a conflict that
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     entire week, I'm going to be out of the country.
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              THE COURT: And you are for Lear so we need you?
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              MR. SANDERS: Yes, Your Honor, I'm for
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     Kyungshin-Lear Sales and Engineering, so I just wanted to --
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              THE COURT:
                           Well, I'm going to want you fellows to
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     work together to find a date. If it doesn't work that week,
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     you know, we can accommodate you, I will accommodate you, you
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     just give me a couple dates and we will take care of it.
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     Okay.
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              MR. SANDERS: Yes, Your Honor. I am happy to do
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     that, I just wanted to go ahead and put it on the record.
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              THE COURT:
                          Thank you very much. Okay. Anything
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     else?
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              MR. KANNER: Your Honor --
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              THE COURT: Mr. Kanner?
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              MR. KANNER: -- my only consideration is that we
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     are trying at some point to coordinate -- hoping to
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     coordinate final approval hearings.
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              As you may recall, on the 16th I mentioned that the
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     final approval hearings, which do take on a different
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significance and are more of a robust hearing, we would like
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     to try to coordinate Lear final approval hearing with the
     Nippon Seiki.
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              THE COURT: The November date?
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              MR. KANNER: Yes, that November date which
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     ultimately -- the further out we push the Lear hearing it
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     becomes an impossibility.
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              THE COURT: Well, maybe you can move it up. If you
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     need to separate them and we can't do them all the same day
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     then we can't, so just keep it in mind.
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              MR. KANNER: I just wanted to raise that
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     possibility.
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              THE COURT: Whatever date we need. I agree with
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     you that that November date would be really nice to have all
15
     of those --
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              MR. KANNER: And that might be another -- we will
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     just go with that, Your Honor. As that date -- as we
     approach this if we feel a need to move with Lear earlier we
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     will address that with counsel and the Court.
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              THE COURT: All right.
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              MR. MAROVITZ: Good morning, Your Honor.
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     Andy Marovitz, I'm counsel for Lear Corporation.
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               I just wanted to make clear that Lear and
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     Kyungshin-Lear are two separate defendants. The slight
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     confusion is because those two defendants are parties to the
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settlement agreements for the dealer plaintiffs and for the end-payor plaintiffs. For the direct-purchaser plaintiffs only Lear is a signatory to that. And I can assure the --THE COURT: Kyungshin-Lear is not on that one? MR. MAROVITZ: They are not a party to that case. THE COURT: Yes. MR. MAROVITZ: I assure the Court, and we have worked cooperatively with plaintiffs' counsel and we can probably even do it today at some point during a break, that we will work to find a date. It is in Lear's interest in this matter given the fact that Lear did not plead guilty, was not found quilty, did not pay a fine, but frankly looking around the room the Court can understand how expensive these cases are and its interest in getting out of it. Lear wants to be out as quickly as possible, and is hoping to get the preliminary and final approval process done as expeditiously as possible. So we will meet with plaintiffs' counsel today and with Mr. Sanders today to try to find a date. We very much appreciate your accommodation in terms of fitting us in when you can, and Lear will continue to do its best to resolve all of the cases as quickly as possible. THE COURT: Well, it is interesting that you mention that looking around the room and why you would be

interested in settling because I looked at the hours that the

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plaintiffs -- different plaintiff groups submitted, because
the Court does keep track of that, I don't know the hours
that the defense groups have put into this case but I have to
assume it is significant. So on my way home last night I'm
thinking remember in the old days, you may not be old enough
to remember this, but we used to settle cases, we will say,
okay, nuisance value, attorney fees.
                                      So I thought, well,
let's make this a nuisance value case; if everybody puts in
what they have got in attorney fees to date we probably have
plenty enough to settle this, so keep that in mind.
         MR. MAROVITZ: We are very reasonably priced, Your
Honor.
         MR. KANNER:
                      There might be some at this table that
look at it other than nuisance value, just for the record.
                     All right. Anything else on that?
         THE COURT:
         (No response.)
         THE COURT:
                     All right. The next item is the wire
harness matters.
                  We have had some updates.
         MR. SQUERI: Yes, Your Honor. Steven Squeri from
Jones Day here on behalf Yazaki.
         As was announced earlier, our client has entered
into an agreement with the auto dealers and the end payors
concerning a settlement. However, we are still in the case
because we also have the claims that are brought against us
by the direct purchasers and also the City of Richmond has a
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complaint pending at this time.

As the Court knows, I'm just referring to the first item on the agenda for wire harnesses, the parties recently concluded the negotiation and stipulation for the supplemental discovery plan.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SQUERI: I just might point out that this comes after more than seven months of very hard negotiations between plaintiffs and defense counsel, and we also have had briefing with the Court in between, we had the issue argued -- issues argued extensively at the last hearing but fortunately we were able to come to a conclusion.

I do want to personally extend thanks to Mr. Hansel and Mr. London, the direct-purchaser counsel, whom I had an opportunity to work with extensively as we finalized this plan, and we are happy that we were able to get it done, and as the Court knows I think it was filed about two weeks ago and the Court entered the order approximately a week or so ago.

Just to sum up what we have accomplished there because I think it is important to understand where we are and what may be immediately under the -- on the horizon, based upon that plan we came up with provisions that deal with the coordination of discovery among the three class cases as well as the related case that was filed by

Ford Motor Company. We came up with a schedule for the service of comprehensive document requests which, in fact, has been already concluded. Those document requests have been served, there have been responses, and the parties are engaged in the meet-and-confer process. Under the plan we do have a schedule in place for resolving disputes, and then once disputes are resolved for the production of documents to take place.

Significantly with respect to that, just so the Court knows what may be on the horizon, based upon what the parties agreed there is certainly a June 23rd deadline for the conclusion of the meet-and-confer process with respect to document request issues as the comprehensive document requests. The parties can by agreement extend it. I don't think there have been any extensions agreed to as of yet, but what that also means is that that becomes a deadline for the filing of either motions to compel discovery or motions for protective order related to any of those issues that cannot be resolved. And I just want to point that out to the Court given the fact that we are talking about the facilitator here and how that might or might not fit into that particular process.

Relatedly, the supplemental discovery plan also says that depositions can take place. Once the deposition protocol is completed they can be noticed. Under the plan

that was agreed to by the parties and filed and signed by the Court, the deadline for concluding the deposition protocol would be coincidentally June 23rd, it's technically 30 days after the order is filed. So once again we have something that may be on the horizon to discuss with a facilitator, although I know some of the counsel, Ms. Sullivan primarily for the defendants, have been engaged in a number of communications with plaintiffs' counsel in trying to arrive at that, but we do have that deadline, and whether or not a facilitator is going to be required to resolve anything I guess we don't know just yet but the parties have been engaged in discussion on that particular issue.

Beyond that we have dealt with other issues like maximum number of interrogatories, deadlines for written discovery, and some of it is tied to the end of the DOJ stay, which for wire harnesses may be earlier simply because of the fact that we were the first of the auto parts cases that were filed in recent years. And there is also a specific provision that deals with scheduling of class certification briefing that we discussed last time that we were here, and what is provided in the plan is that the parties are required, and this was in accordance with the Court's instruction at the hearing the last time, the parties are required once the DOJ stay is entered -- excuse me, lifted, I should say, with respect to wire harnesses, that the parties

are required within 30 days thereafter to suggest to the Court what the schedule might be for briefing, but I think that generally sums up where we are.

THE COURT: I do want to say on wire harness, which is ahead of the other cases, I know there are discussions as to when the class motion should be filed, but I do think we may very well be able and I'm going to hold off on any ruling, I want to see with this facilitator and how easy that goes in, the wire harness may very well be its own and go ahead and let's start looking at what we are looking at here for classes. So please don't think or get the impression that I am intending to hold wire harness back. Okay. So I say that for both sides. I don't know yet where it is going but I would like to move forward with one of these and let's see where we are going with class cert.

MR. SQUERI: Okay. We would agree, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Sullivan?

MS. SULLIVAN: Hello, Your Honor. On the deposition protocol, Mr. Squeri is correct that we do have a deadline of June 23rd in the supplemental discovery plan currently, but I agree with Mr. Williams that we should probably vacate that deadline given that some of the issues that are in dispute and that will require the facilitator are imbedded within that protocol, so I think we should take that

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June 23rd deadline off the table and hopefully we won't have
to start from scratch and that the six weeks of negotiations
that we had relating to other provisions in the protocol we
will be able to build on as we now work with the facilitator,
but I think that June 23rd deadline probably doesn't make any
sense.
         THE COURT:
                     Thank you. Mr. Williams?
         MR. WILLIAMS:
                        Thank you. I actually was going to
say what Ms. Sullivan said, but I also wanted to respond to
the comments about how wire harness progresses in that
certification motion, and simply state for at least our group
that we would simply request that judgment be reserved until
the stay is lifted, and we know how it looks because we as
the party who makes the motion might have a different
proposal to make to the Court how we do that.
         THE COURT: Judgment is reserved, I just want you
         I don't want you to assume anything because the
faster we can move along with these obviously the better.
         Counsel?
         MS. LEUNG: Good morning, Your Honor.
Kanchana Leung on behalf of Ford Motor Company.
         I am pleased to report that the proposed
supplemental discovery provisions have been agreed upon and
have been entered by the Court last week.
         While I'm up here I want to seek clarification
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about the discussion on the special master and facilitator
because Ford had also received Rule 45 subpoenas and their
deadlines for us to complete our meet-and-confer process, and
I just want to clarify that that would also be subject to
whatever facilitator or special master was appointed?
                     Yes, absolutely, Ford would be in
         THE COURT:
there.
                     Thank you.
         MS. LEUNG:
         THE COURT: That would be also true of the City of
Richmond.
         MS. QUADROZZI: Good morning, Your Honor.
Jaye Quadrozzi from Young & Associates on behalf of the City
of Richmond.
         I want to introduce Leslie Weaver to the Court.
She is from the Green & Noblin firm with whom we are serving
as local counsel.
         THE COURT:
                    Okay.
                            Thank you.
         MS. GREEN:
                    Good morning, Your Honor.
         THE COURT:
                    Good morning.
                     I and my firm represent the City of
         MS. GREEN:
Richmond, which filed a complaint on February 20th of this
       We have asserted claims that were on behalf of
indirect purchasers of similarly-situated states, state
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, so that would
include municipalities, certain counties, et cetera.
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THE COURT: Wait a minute. Say that again. 1 2 MS. GREEN: We have asserted claims for indirect 3 purchasers who were excluded from the end-payor class, and what was excluded expressly by the end-payor purchasers were 4 5 essentially municipalities, state subdivisions, et cetera, so 6 that would include the City of Richmond, California who was 7 the plaintiff with whom we filed our first case. We are also 8 representing in this matter not yet filed but Oakland County, 9 Michigan, Traverse City, Michigan and a few other 10 municipalities, a county in North Carolina, a city in 11 New York. We anticipate being retained by additional state 12 subdivisions. We are also coordinating with other state 13 agencies and entities, this is all in the works right now in

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And the reason that we are here, Your Honor, is our firms and our co-counsel have facility representing municipalities and state subdivisions, and we became aware that because of the exclusion those entities that purchase our police cars and our ambulances, et cetera, would be excluded from recovery in these cases if an individual purchaser did not step forward, which is what the City of Richmond did first, and we anticipate additional filings to follow in cases other than wire harness although that's the only case which is currently on file.

this action, for the 19 states which have repealer statutes

which allow municipalities to bring claims.

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THE COURT:
                           Well, you have these municipalities
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     that you've talked about like Traverse City and --
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              MS. GREEN:
                           Yes.
 4
              THE COURT:
                          What's to prevent many more
 5
     municipalities coming in?
 6
                          We have asserted class claims, Your
              MS. GREEN:
 7
     Honor, so the issue we are hoping we can discuss with you
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     today is what we had put on our civil cover sheet is just
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     creating a class pursuant to the December 23rd, 2013
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     electronic case management protocol to give us classification
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     of 2.13-CV-00106, akin to the dealer direct and indirect
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     purchaser classes, and we would represent them.
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              THE COURT: Yes.
                                 In terms of the classification,
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     that's something I put on here too, and we are going to
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     create a new category, like we have 01 is direct and 02 and
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     03 are the indirects, and you would be, because we have Ford,
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     06, and we will call that the public entities' category.
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              MS. GREEN:
                           Thank you, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT:
                           While we are on that, we noted there
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     are some errors in the CM/ECF and we are going to start
21
     working on that. So if you see other errors -- if you see
22
     errors please just drop a note or an e-mail to us so that we
23
                        We know while we are talking about it, not
     can correct this.
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     to confuse everything, but on that 2311, that list is not in
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     chronological order and had to do with the way things were
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originally -- an individual case was entered on, and there is
no way to fix it.
                   The CM/ECF program does not provide for
any way to scramble -- to sort those in chronological order.
So when you see that you might have, you know, 0010 and then
skip to 0015 or something, you just have to look through that
list to get your part; there is no numerical order.
         MS. GREEN:
                     Thank you. And just to report a little
bit on the work we have done since we filed. We have been
coordinating and are familiar with the outstanding counsel
for the different plaintiff classes, so we have been
participating in the discussions regarding the deposition
protocol, the discovery protocol, et cetera, and I think your
ruling today will also enable us to the extent there are
defendants out there also wishing for global relief that we
can act on behalf of the claims asserted as well.
appreciate your ruling.
         There is -- I can report the defendants have
declined to accept service --
         THE COURT:
                    You are in Hague right now?
         MS. GREEN:
                     Sorry?
                    You are at the Hague right now?
         THE COURT:
         MS. GREEN:
                     Exactly, we are. We served our papers
on the central authority in Japan on April 25th.
it will take 60 to 70 days to serve and then another 60 to 70
days to get the proof of service back, and so to the extent
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we would like to move forward we would appreciate it if the
defendants would accept service, they have declined to do so,
so that is the schedule we are currently on, but in the
meantime we are coordinating for as smooth a transition as
possible so we can engage in discovery in step with everybody
else once we are let out of the gate, as it were.
         THE COURT:
                     Okay.
                            And you will participate in the
selection process for the facilitator?
                     Yes, Your Honor, we will.
         MS. GREEN:
         THE COURT:
                     Okay.
                            Thank you.
         MS. GREEN:
                     Thank you.
                     Oh, and the same thing, by the way, in
         THE COURT:
Richmond about the schedule for the motions to dismiss, you
can discuss scheduling with the facilitator but you can go
ahead and file those that you are prepared to file right away
without any waiting.
         MS. GREEN:
                     Okay, Your Honor.
                     The next item is discussion and
         THE COURT:
scheduling of direct-purchaser plaintiffs' motion for an
order directing defendants in the direct-purchaser class
action wire harness to identify settlement classes.
         MR. SPECTOR: Good morning, Your Honor.
         THE COURT: Good morning. We haven't heard from
you today.
         MR. SPECTOR: There was no need up until this
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     point.
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              THE COURT: Okay.
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              MR. SPECTOR: That order was entered yesterday,
     Your Honor.
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              THE COURT:
                          Mr. Spector, for the record, would you
 6
     put your name --
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              MR. SPECTOR: Yes, Your Honor. Eugene Spector for
 8
     the direct-purchaser plaintiffs.
 9
              That order was entered yesterday. We worked out a
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     stipulation and hope to do the same thing in the AutoLiv case
11
     with the defendants.
12
              THE COURT: Very good. Thank you.
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              MR. SPECTOR:
                            Thank you.
14
              THE COURT:
                           Thank you. So we don't need anything
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     else on that. All right.
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               I think the next thing is to go into the bearings
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     motions. I'm looking at motions pending and I have -- that's
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     under B on the 3-B. The first one, oral arguments are
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     waived, and second one --
               (An off-the-record discussion was held at
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21
              11:30 a.m.)
22
              THE COURT: Molly, always being on top of things,
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     said why don't we skip the motions to the end in case some of
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     you want to leave, and I think that's a great idea, so let's
     skip the motions and go right to the next item, which would
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be number six, I believe. Administratively the next status
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     conference is October 8th at 10:00. Everybody's still in
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     agreement October 8th at 10:00?
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              I have also gone ahead and set the next one, so let
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     me get your comments if there is any problem with the date,
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     after the October 1st is January 25th of 2015.
 7
              MR. FINK:
                         Is that a Sunday?
 8
              THE COURT:
                         Is it a Sunday? I certainly don't want
 9
     to do it on Sunday.
10
              MR. FINK:
                          I will bring bagels, Your Honor.
11
              THE COURT: Well, well, maybe we can do it then.
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     Let me take a look here. You're right, I did that well.
                                                                How
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     did I do that? We want to do it on a Wednesday.
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              January 28th? Actually if I could read my own
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     writing that is probably an 8. January 28th? Okay.
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     October 8th and then January 28th.
              Now, I reviewed the schedule and I saw many parts
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     have all of their service done, and so I would like to do --
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     have motion hearings or waived motion hearings, depending
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     when you get there, on a number of those where service is
21
     complete, so I'm going read you the numbers. I need my sheet
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     to tell me what they are. 0800, that's anti-vibrational
23
     rubber parts; 1000, that's the radiators; 1300, which is the
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     switches; 1500, which is motor generators; 1600, steering
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     angle sensors; 1700, HID ballast; 1900, electronic powered
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steering assemblies; 2100, fan motors; 2300, power window motors; and 2800, windshield washer systems.

MR. KESSLER: Jeffery Kessler for the Panasonic defendants.

I think the issue is, and I just don't know if plaintiffs can answer, is whether or not any amended complaint is going to be filed because we did stipulations on a schedule based on the prospect that there would be an amended complaint. So right now, for example, in the cases of 1300, the switches, and 1600, the steering angle sensors, and 1700, HID ballast, there is only one defendant, my client, Panasonic, and we have been told there is going to be an amended complaint but none has been filed.

So I think service is not the issue, the question is are they standing on their complaint? If they are standing on that complaint then we can proceed but I don't know the answer.

MR. WILLIAMS: The answer is we are going to file them and serve them real soon. What we would like to do is get away from -- I think it made sense before to have the extended briefing periods we had, but now that we are seeing most of the issues have been addressed by the Court to shorten that schedule so we can get these things briefed, submitted to the Court, decided, and all of us can move forward.

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THE COURT:
                           When are you going to submit the
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     amended complaint?
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              MR. WILLIAMS: We should be serving the amended
     complaint no later than next Friday and potentially sooner,
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     and we will speak with counsel for Panasonic beforehand.
 6
     think our stipulation provides for us to talk to you about
 7
     that.
 8
              THE COURT: Of course, the amended complaint you
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     are adding defendants?
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              MR. WILLIAMS:
                              I think we are, they have to
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     conspire with someone.
12
              THE COURT: I mean, that makes a difference.
13
              MR. KESSLER:
                             Those defendants may not be in this
14
     MDL, Your Honor, so I don't know how we can discuss the
15
     schedule --
16
              MR. WILLIAMS: Those defendants may be in this
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     courtroom right now, Your Honor.
18
                             I mean, that's the problem, Your
              MR. KESSLER:
19
     Honor, until we at least get plaintiffs on a schedule, they
20
     have to file all of their amended complaints in all of these
21
     29 actions so at least in the 29 actions we know who all the
22
     defendants are and can get them served. Putting aside future
23
     actions, how do we do a schedule? That's the problem.
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              MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, we need to stop --
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              THE COURT: We will do that, and our facilitator --
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see, that's a wonderful thing, somebody needs to keep track
of that.
          And I did have a note here whether you were going
to amend, and I guess it wasn't mentioned.
         MR. WILLIAMS: We will soon, and we would like to
move forward.
         MS. KAFELE: Your Honor, Heather Kafele on behalf
of JTEKT.
         I will also like to note with Mr. Kessler --
         THE COURT: On behalf of who?
         MS. KAFELE: JTEKT, J-T-E-K-T.
         That the electronic power steering assembly case is
similarly situated to Mr. Kessler's cases insomuch as we are
the only defendants so far in that case. There hasn't been
an amended complaint, so service isn't the issue, it is the
same thing as Mr. Kessler --
         THE COURT: All right. What I want plaintiff to do
is submit to the Court within one week of today and the
defendants if they are going to amend the complaint and who
they are going to add, and then we will see can you do a
shortened schedule and still stay on track or not.
                                                    I don't
know and you don't know because you don't know who your
co-defendants are going to be, so we will have to see.
         MS. KAFELE:
                      Okay.
         THE COURT:
                     I will -- all of those that will be
amended I will give you the proposed date, you have the
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     proposed date, those of you who are in the litigation right
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     now of October 8th.
                          If you need to adjourn that just submit
 3
     an order.
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               MR. KESSLER: That's the date to file the motion,
 5
     Your Honor?
 6
                           Pardon me?
               THE COURT:
 7
                             That's the date to file the motion,
               MR. KESSLER:
 8
     or you said October 8th, that's the hearing date?
 9
               THE COURT:
                           That's the hearing date, but you may
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     submit an order --
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               MR. KESSLER: We will submit a schedule after the
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     defendants are named and whether it is possible to do it or
13
     not.
               THE COURT:
14
                           I will keep it on October 8th so I can
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     keep track of it at this point and then file a motion to
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     adjourn that date.
17
               MR. WILLIAMS: What I would like to suggest is that
     the October 8th date could be a backstop, but as we suggest
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     in our motion, if oral argument is not necessary for the
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     Court that perhaps it can just be submitted and maybe even
21
     decided before that date.
22
                          Obviously if you waive oral argument
               THE COURT:
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     then just let me know.
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               MS. ROMANENKO: Your Honor, Victoria Romanenko from
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     Cuneo Gilbert --
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THE COURT:
                     Excuse me one minute because we are
getting dates here.
                     Okay.
                            The filing date for the motion
would be July 14th, if you could do it by July 14th, that's
to file the motion to dismiss. August 25th for the response.
September 8th for reply.
         MR. WILLIAMS: I'm sorry, Your Honor, just to be
clear, in which cases -- is that in all the cases?
         THE COURT: These are in all the cases that I just
mentioned, all of the cases I just mentioned.
                                               The Court
understands some of those where you are going to do an
amended complaint may need to have a motion -- a short motion
to the Court to adjourn the date because defendant doesn't
even know they are being sued right now. Okay. That's to
keep it on track. July 14th, August 25th, September 8th.
         I'm sorry, Counsel. Go ahead.
         MS. ROMANENKO: Victoria Romanenko for dealership
plaintiffs.
         Just to clarify, within a week we will advise the
Court and the defendants as to whether we will be adding
additional defendants to the actions that Your Honor has
listed as ready for amendment and briefing?
                     Right, and you will be adding those
         THE COURT:
defendants like forthwith, right?
         MS. ROMANENKO:
                         Yes.
         THE COURT: Because you've had time.
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MR. KESSLER:
                      Your Honor, I'm sorry to raise
another point about this.
                          So in the cases I have mentioned,
the three matters, there's no direct-purchaser case at all
let alone an amended complaint, and so the question is is
there going to be a date by which we know whether there is
ever going to be a direct-purchaser case?
                                           Is that going to
               That's true in a number of these dockets as
be off track?
well, there is simply no case and so not only do we not know
the defendants, we don't know anything about it, so I just
pose that to direct purchasers as to what the status is.
         THE COURT:
                     So we need a date -- a cutoff date for
amendments of the complaints anyway to add --
         MR. KESSLER: It wouldn't be amendment, it would be
the first case, but if it is going to be part of the
schedules then we have to have something.
         MR. SPECTOR: Well, Your Honor --
         THE COURT:
                     I don't want you to sit there and think
who am I going to sue to get it in.
         MR. SPECTOR: Well, that seems to be the question,
doesn't it, Your Honor?
         Eugene Spector, again, for the direct-purchaser
plaintiffs.
         Your Honor, if we have been retained by a client we
have filed suit.
                  If we have not been retained by a client we
cannot file suit. At this point we have not been retained by
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clients in those cases in which we have not filed suit and
therefore I can't answer the question that has been raised by
Mr. Kessler. I don't think any of us can.
                     Okay.
                            Then we are just going to assume
         THE COURT:
we have what we have right now unless you notify them in the
next week that there are other parties to be added, we are
just going to go on that.
         MR. SPECTOR: And, Your Honor, obviously we will
file suit if we are retained and promptly notify the Court
and the parties.
         THE COURT:
                     Okay.
         MR. SPECTOR:
                       Thank you.
         THE COURT:
                     All right. So let's see now, we are
set for October 8th.
                    We noted in several of those, like
Panasonic was the only defendant in several of them, and the
other was Mitsuba, there was another defendant that was the
only one, so I hope they can be coordinated.
                       I think the issue will be who the
         MR. KESSLER:
other defendants are, we don't know who they are, how they
will be served, or even who their counsel is.
         THE COURT:
                    Okay.
                       Your Honor, I'm sorry, that's not an
         MR. WILLIAMS:
        There is no complaint, there is nothing to respond
    We keep bringing up things that aren't issues. We could
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have a settling defendant who is not named as their

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     co-conspirator, so I think I would just like to avoid
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     raising --
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              THE COURT: We like to bring up all issues.
              MR. WILLIAMS: -- prospective things that don't
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 5
     matter.
 6
                          We need more to talk about.
              THE COURT:
 7
     worry about it. That's okay. All right. So the schedule is
 8
     out.
 9
              Then there is the request for judicial notice but
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     we have received your responses on that so the Court is
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     ready -- will do an opinion on the judicial notice issues,
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     particularly Docket No. 136.
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              Other matters, I had the preliminary approval for
14
     AutoLiv but we have talked about those settlements so we
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     don't need that.
16
              Does anybody have any other matter to discuss
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     outside of the motions which we will have to argue?
18
               (No response.)
19
              THE COURT:
                          Nobody? Yay. Okay. All right.
20
     will then -- let's take a break or do you want to go to lunch
21
     for an hour and come back and do the motions?
22
              MR. KESSLER: Your Honor, if it is possible to not
23
     take the lunch break, we don't think the arguments are going
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     to be that long and we can drive through, that I think would
25
     at least help out-of-town counsel if that's possible?
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THE COURT:
                           I'm more than willing to do that.
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     Let's take about ten minutes right now and then we will start
 3
     our argument.
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               MR. KESSLER:
                             Thank you.
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               THE COURT:
                           Thank you all.
 6
                               All rise.
               THE LAW CLERK:
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               (Court recessed at 11:43 a.m.)
 8
 9
               (Court reconvened at 12:01 p.m.; Court, Counsel and
10
               all parties present.)
11
               THE LAW CLERK: All rise. You may be seated.
12
                          All right. We have something for the
               THE COURT:
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     record on the Lear.
                          Counsel?
14
               MR. MAROVITZ:
                              Thank you, Your Honor.
15
     Andy Marovitz for Lear Corporation and Steve Kanner for the
16
     direct-purchaser plaintiffs.
17
               We had a chance during the break to find a
18
     convenient date for counsel for Lear, for Kyungshin-Lear as
19
     well as counsel for the direct-purchaser plaintiffs, the
20
     dealer plaintiffs and end-payor plaintiffs for the
21
     consideration of the preliminary approval hearing, and
22
     July 1st, with the Court's indulgence, would work for all of
23
                   We are hopeful that would be convenient for
     those groups.
24
     the Court.
25
               THE COURT: All right. Let me -- that's a Tuesday?
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              MR. KANNER:
                          I think that's a Monday.
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              THE COURT:
                           It's a Tuesday, July 1st, 2014 is a
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     Tuesday.
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              MR. KANNER:
                           Okay.
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              THE COURT:
                           Is that okay? I can't change the
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     calendar.
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              MR. KANNER: You have judicial authority, Your
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     Honor.
 9
                          All right. Let's pick a time.
              THE COURT:
                                                            I do
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     have -- I do have something at 3:00 but if we could do it in
11
     the morning. Is that good? Now, you are coming from out of
12
     town?
13
              MR. MAROVITZ: I am but at your convenience, Your
14
     Honor.
             July 1st works for us?
15
              THE COURT: Do you fly in in the morning or --
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              MR. MAROVITZ: It depends how early. Will you give
17
     us just ten seconds?
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               (An off-the-record discussion was held at
19
              12:03 p.m.)
20
              MR. KANNER: We were just clarifying, Your Honor,
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     the requirement -- the local requirement in between the date
22
     for filing the motion for preliminary approval and the
23
                   And I believe if we file on the 18th --
     hearing date.
24
              MR. MAROVITZ: On the 11th.
25
              MR. KANNER: On the 11th of June, excuse me, we do
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just make it, so the hearing could be on July -- actually it
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     could be July 1st, 2nd, in that time period.
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              THE COURT: Well --
              MR. KANNER: But before we set the date we wanted
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 5
     to make sure we are in compliance.
 6
                          You think you can do it?
              THE COURT:
                                                     If we do it
 7
     July 1st that would be a good date?
 8
              MR. MAROVITZ: That's right.
 9
              THE COURT: Let's do it July 1st, it really won't
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     take all that long, so how about 11:00?
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              MR. KANNER: 11:00 is fine, Your Honor.
12
              MR. MAROVITZ: Thank you, Your Honor.
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              MR. KANNER: Thank you very much.
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              THE COURT: Okay. All right. Going on then to the
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     motions, the first one I have to be argued is the NTN motion
16
     to dismiss all class actions.
17
              MR. KESSLER: Yes, Your Honor. It is
18
     Jeffery Kessler again.
19
              The only connection between NTN and Panasonic --
20
              THE COURT: Just one minute, Counsel. I want to
21
     pull up the motion.
22
              MR. KESSLER:
                            Thank you, Your Honor. I'm appearing
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     for NTN and NTN USA.
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              Let me start out by saying that we are not seeking
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     in this motion to reargue, to change, to alter any of the
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legal rulings that you've made in your prior decisions in wire harnesses or in instrument panel clusters or anything else. We fully understand the standards you have adopted and the reasoning you have applied and we accept all of that, so this is not an attempt to reargue.

What we do believe, Your Honor, is that applying each and every one of the standards this Court has pronounced applied to the specific allegations regarding NTN and NTN USA, that plaintiffs have not met their burden under those standards of this Court. What plaintiffs like to say, and I'm sure they will say it again, is that you have heard these arguments a million times before, Your Honor, and everyone is going to get up and make these arguments. With all due respect to plaintiffs, Your Honor, my arguments are based on my client's allegations and the facts about what they said about them. It is not based on anybody else's allegations. You have never looked at this issue before. So I hope that you will look at it independently, I know you will, and I will explain why I believe that these two clients are entitled to be dismissed from both the direct and the indirect cases.

First of all, Your Honor, let me just review quickly what there isn't alleged about my client because that makes it very different from some of the cases you have already had. There is no allegation that my clients attended

any specifically identified competitor meetings concerning the United States, none. There is nothing identified, there is no claim. I mean, there is a general allegation all defendants conspired but there is nothing more specific about either one of my clients about that.

There are no allegations that my clients entered into any plea agreements because they did not. My clients have not pled, they have not been charged, okay, so there is no basis to use that against them in any way.

Further, the two pleas that there are in bearings, which they are certainly entitled to use, don't mention my client, don't indicate anything about my client. They are limited to the two companies who pled primarily, not my clients, so you can't add anything from them. I'm not saying limit them to the pleas, I'm saying they don't add anything with respect to my clients. There is no allegations about what role my client played in the conspiracy, either one of them, what they did, how they did it. This isn't like wire harnesses when there was a discussion of the RFQ process and what happened. There is just nothing there about that. There is no allegation we had any information exchanges about the United States, nothing at all.

So what is there? So that's what there is not. So what is there? And, Your Honor, I'm not going to tell you what there is in my own words. What I urge you to do is they

filed their opposition, their opposition from pages 1 to 3 details their statement of the facts against NTN and NTN USA, so this is it, this is all they have called to your attention to say here is what we have alleged. When you look at what they have stated, and that's what I'm going to go through, and consider it all together -- I'm not -- I'm not telling you look at it one by one and wipe the slate clean or anything else that they are going to say, I'm saying look at it all together but I have to discuss it one by one, Your Honor, because the English language requires me to do that.

THE COURT: I want to get the dates right when they -- when the Japanese Fair Trade Commission gave the cease and desist order.

MR. KESSLER: I will be happy to address that. The first thing and most of their brief is about the fact that the JFTC has issued a cease and desist order and allegations and charges against NTN, the Japanese company, okay, about violations of doing something regarding sales in Japan. That is all, period, end of story. They do not make an allegation in this complaint -- this is very important -- that the conduct that the JFTC charged discussed the United States or discussed any U.S. sales, so this is the pure situation like in the elevator case in the 2nd Circuit where there were EU charges filed about a conspiracy involving sales in the EU, and the 2nd Circuit said you can't just infer just because

somebody did something in one market that makes it plausible they did it elsewhere, and I will explain why.

The United States antitrust laws are much tougher. It is criminal. There are good reasons why to infer the opposite, that if somebody might do something in a country like Japan where it is not exactly enforced the same way, or at least it has not been historically, that they wouldn't do something here bolstered by the fact that my client has not been charged in the United States. So we could assume — they point out — they plead that my U.S. subsidiary got a subpoena in the United States. Let's assume that's true because that's what they pled. So we respond to a subpoena, we give information to the United States, and the United States makes no charges against NTN.

What those collective facts show is unless you are willing to become the first court in the country, and I would say it is the first court to say just because you are charged in another jurisdiction about doing something in a foreign company I will just assume like you are a bad company, so it is plausible and you meet the Twombly test that you did something in the United States, that doesn't get them past it. That's the essential issue about that. That's their failure.

The second thing that they allege -- that's almost half of their facts that they allege is the JFTC, that's what

they come back with. What else did they do? After the JFTC and Japanese proceedings -- and, by the way, they point out NTN executives are criminally charged in Japan. Same issue, it is only about doing things in Japan, there is no allegations they are being --

THE COURT: What were they doing in Japan?

MR. KESSLER: They are charged, Your Honor, with having engaged in price fixing involving sales in Japan which, of course, are not subject to the United States antitrust laws. Again, Your Honor, you can't draw the inference that just because they might have or might not have, they are defending so I don't want to say they have, just because they have been charged there you can't draw an inference and say here, especially when the Department of Justice has looked at it here and has done nothing, and when the pleas here, the two pleas very clearly don't relate to the behavior of my client in terms of that in the United States.

We can assume -- it is interesting, they point out that NSK and JTEKT were in the Japanese case also, in other words, they are charged in Japan also. Okay. So one would assume that if they had information to implicate us in the United States, something as part of the pleas that were entered or as part of the leniency application that was made, the department would have that information and charge our

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client about that, but they haven't done that because, Your
Honor, there is nothing to charge my client about in the
United States. So, again, it is all based on solely
something in another market. There have been cases and they
pointed out some --
                            Let me go back though.
                     Okay.
want to get these dates. JFTC issued its cease and desist
order in 2013; was that right?
         MR. KESSLER: I believe that's correct, Your Honor.
         THE COURT: And it alleges the price fixing from
what period to what period?
         MR. KESSLER: It was 2010 going forward.
what was charged in the JFTC order. Again, nothing about
this earlier period which, again, their conspiracy they
allege in the United States and about which they have pleas
from other defendants is different conduct, a different
period of time involving the United States so, again, it is
just separate about them and that again the case I would
refer Your Honor to is the elevator case in the 2nd Circuit.
         Now, they do cite cases where foreign allegations
have been looked at where the plaintiff had facts saying here
are foreign charges and I am now alleging facts that during
those foreign meetings there was this discussion about the
United States. So in that context the court said oh, well,
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we can look at that together as part of the different courts

that have said that. There are no such allegations here, that's very significant. They don't allege that at the meetings that the JFTC charged in 2010 there was any specific discussion about the United States and the United States prices or anything involving the United States. So that's their gap and that's what the courts have said is not enough to get through the hurdle. Even if they have enough to get through the clients who did pleas, obviously somebody pled in the United States, they may have something to say about them, it doesn't bring in our client necessarily.

Now, what else do they say? In addition to that, and this is all that they say, they say that NTN's United States subsidiary has been served with a DOJ subpoena. Okay. How does that help them? I think that goes the other way. You know, they have been served with a subpoena, they have been investigated by the DOJ and the DOJ has done nothing. How does that support an inference -- a Twombly inference that we participated in a conspiracy in the United States? So that's their next one.

One after that, NTN USA is a wholly owned subsidiary of NTN Corporation. That obviously doesn't advance the ball on anything, Your Honor herself has noted that, that doesn't move anything particularly here because there is nothing against the parent, so being a sub of the parent doesn't move anything.

Then they go during the class period USA's activities have been under the control and direction of NTN Corp. Even assume that's true, it doesn't advance the ball because there is nothing to connect anything. The acts done by NTN USA were authorized, ordered and condoned by their parent company but there are no acts alleged. So, again, there is like a fundamental gap.

I'm reading literally every single thing they said after the JFTC. Through its wholly-owned and controlled subsidiaries, NTN Corp has marketed, manufactured and/or sold bearings -- automotive bearings purchased throughout the United States. Well, that's true too, okay, but unless it can be guilt by association the fact that they have sold in the United States can't be enough.

And here is the last one -- I'm sorry, there's something after that. NTN USA manufactured, marketed and/or sold bearings that were purchased in the United States during the class period, including by firms that sold them to the dealership plaintiffs and the class members. That's it for NTN.

Their final paragraph is the market is conducive to conspiracy because they have alleged there are high barriers to entry, it is highly concentrated, and it has opportunities to conspire.

Your Honor, take every single allegation in their

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plaintiffs.

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complaint, take everything they said from page 1 to 3 of
their brief, okay, and they do not advance the ball on
Twombly with respect to my two clients who have not pled
quilty, who have not been charged in the United States.
         My final point, Your Honor, I don't know if they
are going to raise the EU thing because that's what they
filed the judicial notice motions before you, but if Your
Honor let's that in, and we argue you should not, but let's
assume you let it in for a moment, if you let it in that's
only specifically about the EU. If you read the press
release they charge it is something very specific about the
EU, a different conspiracy, a different time period, and by
the way, only automotive, nothing to do with industrial.
         Remember the directs have an added burden than the
indirects because they have alleged an industrial bearings
conspiracy.
             There is nothing about the U.S. and industrial
bearings for my two clients.
         So, Your Honor, I hope that you will scrutinize
those allegations, and I'm quite confident you will not find
another case in this MDL docket or any other case in the
country that has said this is enough against these two
defendants.
             Thank you very much.
         THE COURT:
                     Thank you. Response?
         MR. DAVIDOW: Joel Davidow for the dealer
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Let me start for a moment with the obvious comparison between an elevator and a ball bearing. As far as I know, if you wanted an elevator for a building here in Detroit you wouldn't have it made in Europe and put it on a ship and mail it because it is very big and very heavy and very wasteful. But if you wanted ball bearings would you possibly get them from Europe and Japan? The answer is people do every day. There is a worldwide trade. Ball bearings are small, they are made in all sizes and all shapes to meet all needs. The idea that there is -- because there is no world trade in elevators there is no world trade in ball bearings is nonsense.

To take a particular example, there has been a five-year anti-dumping case called certain ball bearings from Japan and including automotive. Well, an anti-dumping case only starts when the U.S. industry complains that Japanese imports into the United States are growing too fast. That case was now dismissed, there is a press release, and it is dismissed. Well, how do you get it dismissed? The answer is by pulling your U.S. prices up to your Japanese prices. If your -- and Mr. Kessler is an expert in anti-dumping, if you want to get rid of an anti-dumping case you make sure the U.S. price is exactly the same.

To go back let's start with a simple point. In most books that have a chapter under national antitrust and

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U.S., and they start with a colloquy between Senator
John Sherman of Ohio, a 6th Circuit person, and a doubting
senator who said, Senator, how are you going to make sure
that if the price fixing is offshore you catch it? And the
senator said well, I'm not going to write a bill just about
restraint of the interstate commerce of the United States.
My bill, the Sherman Act, is going to say that you are quilty
and suable in treble damages if you restrain the interstate
or the foreign commerce of the United States.
         When the law was clarified by limiting U.S.
application to export sales or purely foreign sales it said
imports were not subject to the reform. In other words,
imports were always a per-se violation. If you fix prices
and it is as to imports the violation of the U.S. law is
complete.
         Now, let's --
         THE COURT:
                     If you fix prices --
                      As to things that are going to be
         MR. DAVIDOW:
imported.
         Now, here you get to two simple points, there is a
magic word that Mr. Kessler uses and it is the word
concerning the U.S., that is his view is if the Japanese as
they fix their prices in Japan and in 26 European countries
didn't mention the word U.S., that it wasn't a discussion
concerning the U.S. Well, there are two things wrong with
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that.

To take an example, Harry Martin, my original client, imports Volkswagens. If you have an enormous price-fixing cartel in the common market, the largest maker of cars in the common market is Volkswagen, and there will be NTN or its co-conspirator ball bearings in every Volkswagen that comes in, and it doesn't matter whether the NTN when they were fixing the price to Volkswagen said oh, gee, they are going to the U.S. or they just knew it. If they fixed it and they knew it they are guilty, full stop, summary judgment.

The same thing, the Lexus is made in Japan. If they all agree in Japan that all of their prices in Japanese sales would be up ten percent then they raise the price ten percent on all of the ball bearings that went to the Lexus, and when the Lexus is largely sold in the United States and it is not made here. Well, obviously they know perfectly well the Lexus is made for the U.S. market but they might not have mentioned the word U.S. market.

THE COURT: So your argument basically is if they fix the prices in Japan --

MR. DAVIDOW: Yes.

THE COURT: -- and they know those parts are coming to the U.S., that's sufficient?

MR. DAVIDOW: It is full stop. Let's go further.

There was a mention of Europe, and remember I would pose that there are two ways in which you could accept this judgment of the common market. One is the judicial notice of foreign thing, but the other one it says specifically in the press release, which you have, that NTN got a ten-percent fine reduction because it admitted its guilt. Well, admissions of guilt under exception of Federal Rule of Evidence 601, I believe, are fully admissible unless Mr. Kessler says that there was some error and his client really didn't admit their guilt.

The next point is we are supposed to show here that it is plausible that when they agreed to prices in Europe and when they agreed to prices in Japan they would have implicitly or explicitly raised them in the U.S. as well.

Well, I would submit that it is implausible that they could have possibly avoided that. For instance, if they are selling to Toyota, and they have branchs here that sell to Toyota and branchs there, and they raise the price of a packet of ball bearings from \$4.00 to \$4.40 in Japan, if they didn't raise it to \$4.40 in the U.S., Toyota being the smart person would ask, one, how come you are charging me less than the U.S., or Toyota, being a smart buyer, would start buying entirely from their U.S. sub.

So the only way they can make the conspiracy work is to tell their sub to exactly match their price to Toyota

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     since they supplied them in both markets and Toyota talks to
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     each other and have the same price, otherwise they would be
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     arbitraged against them so that -- and the other point --
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              THE COURT: Who did they conspire with?
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              MR. DAVIDOW: NTN, NSK and so on conspired with
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     each other in Japan and conspired with each other in Europe,
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     and they conspired on -- taking the four main defendants in
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     which NTN received the second highest fine, NSK and NTN,
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     we're supposed to have fixed all automotive prices in Japan.
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     Well, prices to Toyota or prices to Lexus are automotive
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     prices in Japan, but I'm saying that the practicalities --
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     the plausibility is that it would be implausible for them not
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     to raise their U.S. price to Toyota simultaneously with their
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     decision to raise the prices by cartel in Japan so that each
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     of the conspirators which had branchs in the U.S., which sold
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     to the transplants of the Japanese, would by necessity have
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     to match those prices in the U.S. to avoid questions or
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     arbitrage --
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              THE COURT:
                           Okay.
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              MR. DAVIDOW: -- so it is highly, highly
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     implausible.
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              The further evidence of this, of course, they are
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     now -- they have conspired with NSK, both in Europe and in
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     Japan.
             The NSA quilty plea didn't say NTN was innocent, it
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     just didn't name who its co-conspirators were. They are
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treating it somehow as silence is an exoneration of NTN.

The extreme of this, by the way, is the potash case in which Judge Diane Wood actually had a group of Russian and Canadian price fixers who met and set Canadian and worldwide potash prices, with a great anti-trust lawyer, said we exclude the U.S., totally exclude the U.S., which is not claimed here, and -- but when they sold to the U.S. they said we sell to you at world-market prices, so world-market prices have just been set by the cartel.

And Judge Wood said well, whether you set U.S. prices or you tell the U.S. that you have to pay world-market prices, you have just cartelized the world, it comes to the same thing, we are not stupid, we understand when you caused the increase through your cartel activities in the U.S., whether you did it by specific orders, by matching orders, by reference to world-market prices, it is implausible that you could have a two-price system on a fungible good that you make here and there for the same cars that travel around the world in the same goods.

The last line I would only say just because I like the story is Umpire Bill Klem, strict man, and he called batter out, batter was very annoyed, he threw his bat way up in the air. Bill Klem said young man, if that bat comes down you're out of the game.

Well, it seems to me that what I would say to

Mr. Kessler is that if one ball bearing that you fixed the price of in Japan or Europe, if you didn't prevent every one of them from getting here and every one of them from being in a part that gets here, that every time that one of them gets here you have lost the Twombly game and, in fact, you have lost it a million times before this case before we made this motion.

THE COURT: Thank you. Brief?

MR. KESSLER: Brief, Your Honor, but it is significant, very significant, because this argument is nowhere in their complaint, nowhere in their brief, so we have never addressed it before, so please indulge me. There are three strikes so he's out on this argument.

Strike number one is contrary to what he just told you, and we will file a supplemental brief if Your Honor likes that under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, which amended the Sherman Act discussion that he spoke about, it is specifically not enough that you've sold a bearing in Japan and could imagine that it would be imported into the United States some day. That is not the legal test.

The legal test, as he knows, is either it must be a discussion to directly affix the import price, the import price, so when you are importing it for which there are no allegations in the complaint, none, or -- or it has to have a direct, substantial and foreseeable effect in the United

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States. They cannot plead the direct effect, and they have not pled anywhere in their case the direct effect. There has been a huge decision on this just now by the 7th Circuit that is actually on a rehearing en banc. There have been decisions in other circuits. He has not done anything to plead the economic effects that are required under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act. I would like an opportunity to brief that, Your Honor, because I can show that while he waxed eloquently about this it is legally wrong. It would be completely wrong.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. KESSLER: The second thing, Your Honor, is everything he said is not in his complaint. There are no allegations in his complaint that at the Japan meetings or the EU meetings there was a discussion to set a world price like he alleged about potash. If he alleges that in his complaint he would violate Rule 11, but if he alleged that in his complaint then I have to deal with that allegation. doesn't get to just come up here and tell Your Honor, Your Honor, I'm going to tell you it is this, it is that, it is Let him do that under Rule 11. Dismiss the complaint there. and see if he will put that under the Rule 11. I don't know what basis he has to say there were agreements about, but if you look at the JFTC materials he cited and the EU materials he cited, they only discuss Japan prices in the JFTC and they

only discuss EU prices in the EU, and they say nothing about export prices to the United States. They say nothing about import prices to the United States.

So he's giving you a hypothetical scenario that is not in his complaint, that's exactly what you can't do. If he -- if you want to dismiss with leave to replead, let's see him try to plead those facts. I don't know what basis he will have to possibly plead them to tie that here. That's what the cases say. That's the second strike about this.

The third strike here he said to you it is implausible that you would set a price in Japan and have a different price in the United States. Well, he also told you there was a dumping case against bearings. What does a dumping case mean? It means the allegation was there was higher prices in Japan than in the United States. That's what he told you about the dumping case. He didn't plead it. That gives you a totally plausible reason why you cannot infer because there were higher prices in one market there would not be lower prices in the United States. That is what the dumping laws are about.

Now, frankly I have tremendous respect for Mr. Davidow, he actually was involved in some of these laws in the Department of Justice, but he's dead wrong about the FTIA, he's dead wrong about the plausibility here based on the dumping laws, and there is nothing in his complaint that

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     satisfies that.
                      So, Your Honor, since he's raised these
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     issues of world effects and jurisdiction, I would request
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     that we get to file a supplemental brief. Your Honor, it can
     be brief, so we can present to you the law on the FTIA
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     because it was never argued in his brief and never presented
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     in his complaints.
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                           All right. You may file a supplemental
               THE COURT:
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     brief, no more than ten pages in seven days.
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               MR. KESSLER:
                             Thank you, Your Honor.
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               MR. DAVIDOW:
                            May I have a moment, Your Honor?
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               THE COURT: May you have a what?
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               MR. DAVIDOW: May I have a moment for a sur-reply
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     brief?
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               THE COURT:
                          You may file a sur-reply brief.
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                            No more oral?
               MR. DAVIDOW:
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               THE COURT:
                          No more oral. Three days after, no
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     more than five pages.
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               MR. WILLIAMS:
                              I wanted to make sure I heard, did
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     you say three days after their brief?
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               THE COURT:
                           Yes.
21
               MR. WILLIAMS: And a five-page limit?
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               THE COURT:
                           Right.
23
                              Thank you.
               MR. WILLIAMS:
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               MR. MAHR:
                          Good afternoon, Your Honor.
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     Eric Mahr for Schaeffler AG and Schaeffler Group USA.
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Just to put Schaeffler -- the two Schaeffler entities in the context of this morning's discussions, neither Schaeffler entity has been named in any other suit, we are only in the bearing suit. Neither Schaeffler entity has pled guilty.

We have two motions, a 12(b)(6) motion and a 12(b)(2) motion. Mr. Kessler just vigorously argued the 12(b)(6) points that we would make also. I would just point out that plaintiffs' complaint with respect to bearings focuses particularly on Japanese conduct among Japanese corporations in Japan affecting Japanese customers. The two guilty pleas in the bearings cases are Japanese entities, and Schaeffler is a German company, it is just kind of one step removed. So I agree with everything Mr. Kessler is saying, and just note that Schaeffler AG and Schaeffler USA are both one step removed from that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MAHR: I also understand that you don't want to hear the same old thing from us, and I think I do have something unique because at least for the hearings that I have been in attendance, I think I will be the first defense counsel to come to the podium and fully embrace this principle of consistency that you have established in these cases, at least as it goes to the 12(b)(2) personal jurisdiction motions, because applying that principle of

consistency, which I take to mean where you have the same facts you get the same result, applying that principle to Schaeffler AG and comparing it to the Leoni AG dismissal and the S-Y Europe dismissals in the wire harness case, the result is clear that Schaeffler AG should be dismissed for the same reasons and on the same grounds.

In fact, if anything, Schaeffler AG, the minimum contacts with this jurisdiction of the United States are even more remote with respect to Schaeffler AG. For example, Leoni provided financing services, IT services, had bank accounts in the United States, none of that was enough. But in the case of Schaeffler AG none of that exists; Schaeffler AG doesn't have any bank accounts.

Also in this case we have made an extensive affirmative showing, even though it is plaintiffs' burden to establish personal jurisdiction, we have provided you with three affidavits. They go through, and I won't go through them now, you know the test, but they go through the general jurisdiction test, they go through all of this other machine factors, all of the Alexander Associates factors concerning alter-ego jurisdiction, and in each case we have come forward with a declaration from the relevant people at Schaeffler AG or Schaeffler USA concerning each of those.

The 6th Circuit has made it very clear in the Carrier vs. Outokumpu case, in the Tennyson vs. Matthews case

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that, quote, in the face of a properly supported motion for
dismissal a plaintiff must, by affidavit or otherwise, set
forth specific facts showing that the court has jurisdiction,
end quote. That's from Carrier, 673 F.3rd at 449.
         I say that because not only is it their burden to
establish the Court's personal jurisdiction, but in the face
of our motion they have to come forward with specific facts
and they have come forward with nothing. Our briefs go
through the various allegations they make in their opposition
but not in any kind of affidavit or any other form --
         THE COURT: There is no affidavit.
                    Just to hit on two of them, they state
         MR. MAHR:
in their brief that a Mr. Klaus Rosenfeld is CFO of both
Schaeffler AG and Schaeffler USA, and they are wrong on both
counts. With respect to Schaeffler AG, Klaus Rosenfeld is
the CEO of that entity. With respect to Schaeffler USA,
Klaus Rosenfeld has never worked for Schaeffler USA, he's
never been their CFO, CEO or anything else. He's never been
on the board of directors. He has no --
         THE COURT: Nobody has ever been on both at the
same time in any event?
                    We point out a couple. Over the last
         MR. MAHR:
ten years there has been a couple instances when the
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founders -- this is a company founded by two brothers, one of

their sons, who is still alive, has sat on -- there are

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     different level of boards in Germany, but it is the highest
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     level of the board in Germany and the board in the United
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     States. He no longer does but he did for a period.
              But I think in addition to our affirmative showing
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     that there is not personal jurisdiction, when you look at the
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     quality of what they have come back with it really
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     underscores a lack of a showing on their part.
                                                      In addition
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     to the mistakes about Mr. Rosenfeld and other employees, they
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     actually went out and apparently pulled off the Internet 30
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     names that they felt were German sounding that Dun &
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     Bradstreet said were related to the USA entity,
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     Schaeffler USA, and they said because these 30 people have
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     German sounding names out of 5,000 Schaeffler USA employees
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     that there must be some kind of minimum contacts with the
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     United States of Schaeffler AG, the other entity.
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              Even if that were true it wouldn't be enough, but
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     we went out and looked at those 30 names, only 9 of them have
     ever been employed by Schaeffler USA currently or formerly,
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     and of those 9 none of them were also simultaneously or
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     otherwise employed by the German entity Schaeffler AG.
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              THE COURT: Okay.
22
                          So all of this I think makes clear that
              MR. MAHR:
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     there is no basis for personal jurisdiction here and there is
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     no reason to give them discovery on it because they have
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     essentially got that by kind of throwing out these
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allegations and having us respond to them with affidavits and

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     sworn statements, they really got more information about
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     Schaeffler AG than they are entitled to.
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               THE COURT:
                           Thank you.
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               MR. MAHR:
                          Thank you.
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                           Who is responding?
               THE COURT:
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               MR. HOESE:
                          May it please the Court, my name is
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     William Hoese, and I'm with the Kohn, Swift firm.
                                                          It is
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     H-O-E-S-E.
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               I'm here to address the motions to dismiss by
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     Schaeffler AG and Schaeffler Group USA under 12(b)(6) on
12
     behalf of all of the plaintiff groups. And I'm also here to
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     address the personal jurisdiction motion filed by
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     Schaeffler AG also on behalf of all of the plaintiff groups.
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               THE COURT:
                           Okay.
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               MR. HOESE: Your Honor, if I could also beg your
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     indulgence, Mr. Davidow in his argument may have neglected to
     mention some allegations in the direct-purchasers' complaint
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     regarding NTN and the United States market, and at the end of
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     my presentation regarding Schaeffler, if it's okay with the
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     Court, I would like to at least put that on the record.
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               THE COURT:
                           All right.
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                           The presentation regarding -- by
               MR. HOESE:
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     Schaeffler on the 12(b)(6) motion was brief but to the point.
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     However, the standard here is whether it is plausible that
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the Schaeffler entities were a part of a conspiracy that had effects in the United States, and as this Court has said with respect to a number of the other cases, if I may paraphrase, it is undisputed that price fixing in the bearings market occurred, and I think that is undisputed. There are two guilty pleas in the United States by two of the Japanese manufacturers, and among other things in the guilty pleas the government says that it would have proven that had it gone to trial that these Japanese manufacturers, NSK and JTEKT, participated in a conspiracy with other bearing manufacturers, plural. So the suggestion that it was limited to these two I think doesn't -- isn't borne out by what the Government said.

There is also an attempt to downplay the connection between the European governmental action against all of the defendants in this case, every single one of them, as well as some others, were caught up in the EU investigation. And if I may read for a second from the EC press release, the European Commission have found that two European companies, SKF and Schaeffler, and four Japanese companies, JTEKT, NSK, NFC, which is Nachi-Fujikoshi, and NTN with its French subsidiary, operated a cartel in the market for automotive bearings. The companies colluded to secretly coordinate their pricing strategy vis-à-vis automotive customers for more than seven years from April 2004 until July 2011 in the

whole European economic area, which I didn't know was 26 countries until Mr. Davidow mentioned it.

Going further, the companies involved in this secret cartel coordinated the passing on of steel-price increases to their automotive customers, colluded on requests for quotations and for annual price reductions from customers and exchanged commercially sensitive information. This occurred through multi, tri and bilateral contacts.

And with respect to Schaeffler, Schaeffler as well as some of the Japanese and the Swedish company benefited from reductions of fines under the 2006 leniency notice for their cooperation. The reductions reflect the timing of their cooperation and the extent to which the evidence they provided helped the commission to prove the existence of the cartel. These guys turned themselves in after the investigation started. That's Schaeffler.

And if I may also say Schaeffler is not a public company but because it borrows lots of money does prepare annual reports. Schaeffler started to disclose because of the -- it didn't want to run afoul, I guess, of not telling potential creditors of problems, antitrust problems, what it said, and this is in the -- for example, in the 2011 Schaeffler annual report, and this is by the Schaeffler Group, the Schaeffler AG --

In Re: Automotive Parts Antitrust Litigation • 12-02311

THE COURT: All of them. Okay.

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MR. HOESE: They hold themself out as an integrated worldwide group, and I can't go through the entire superstructure, which is all of these other holding companies above Schaeffler AG, but as I will mention with respect to the 12(b)(2) motion, Schaeffler AG is the holding company that manages all of the operating companies, so it really -and we will get into the control aspect of it, but in 2011 Schaeffler writes, and this is a public document, in late 2011 several antitrust authorities have commenced investigations of several manufacturers of rolling and plain bearings for the automotive and other industrial sectors. The authorities are investigating possible agreements violating antitrust laws. Schaeffler AG and some of its subsidiaries are subject to these investigations. Schaeffler goes on to say it is cooperating. Essentially it makes the same disclosures in 2012. So this is Schaeffler AG that is under investigation and its subsidiaries. Here Schaeffler has the Schaeffler Group USA, and the Schaeffler Group USA manufactures and sells essentially all the bearings for the Schaeffler Group in the United States and other countries of North America. Not only does it manufacture and sell them here to 23 auto manufacturers, as set forth in the Schaeffler annual reports, and tier one and two component part manufacturers, ball bearings made in Germany are also imported by the Schaeffler Group USA and

presumably sold in the United States.

So all of these are indicia that Schaeffler was involved in this conspiracy. Not only that, we have the Japanese, which you talked to Mr. Davidow about, both the civil and the criminal activities that were uncovered and prosecuted in Japan. The Japanese as well import bearings into the United States, and there was a discussion about what that shows, and I'm certainly not prepared to address that today, but these allegations about Japanese investigations, prosecutions that resulted in guilty verdicts, multi — hundreds of millions of dollars worth of fines, the United States Department of Justice has brought two cases and has subpoenaed Schaeffler Group USA as well.

THE COURT: Schaeffler AG does not manufacture or sell any product?

MR. HOESE: That's my understanding, Your Honor, that it does not manufacture or sell directly, it operates through its various subsidiaries around the world, one of which is the Schaeffler Group USA, which is in South Carolina, but Schaeffler Group North America, I mean, they really kind of have different expressions for what I think is the same thing, has a center in Troy, Michigan as well, not that the contacts have to be with Michigan with respect to personal jurisdiction, but they serve the auto industry in the U.S.

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The Japanese quilty pleas relate to the auto industry in the U.S. It said the discussions were in the U.S. and elsewhere. They sold to Japanese manufacturers and component suppliers in the United States and elsewhere. Just when you put all of this together with the allegations that the Court found sufficient in wire harness, heater control, instrument panel cluster, of the market structure, again, here these -- the defendants have 60 percent of the market. Schaeffler is one of the top three it says in industrial and in automotive. The fact that there are all high barriers to entry, there is a free flow of these materials we believe pushes our complaint and the allegations in the complaint, and again I'm speaking about all of the complaints, over the line to plausibility. Perhaps before I get into the 12(b)(2), if I could just mention the NTN, Your Honor? THE COURT: All right. I apologize for having to do it but I MR. HOESE: think it is important. In the direct-purchaser complaint, consolidated amended class action complaint, which is Document 100 filed in the bearings cases, there is a discussion of the U.S. bearings market starting on page 27 and going to page 28, and it talks about exportation of bearings by NTN, NSK, Nachi-Fujikoshi and JTEKT, where we

allege that they exported on average 55 percent of their

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bearings to the United States and Europe, and that the
United States imports 40 percent of its bearings from Asia.
We also allege that NTN derives the majority of its revenue
from sales within the United States.
         In paragraph 118 we also allege that prices in the
United States increased during the same period that the
Japanese and other bearings manufacturers have admitted to
conspiring to raise bearing prices outside of the United
States.
         We also make allegations, although this didn't
arise, about control of the U.S. subsidiaries by the Japanese
          Specifically we allege that NTN had a complete
shadow-management structure to oversee sales of bearings in
the United States, and that defendants and their
co-conspirators, domestic pricing was also controlled by
foreign parents with a foreign entity acting as suppliers of
the domestic subsidiaries. So I just wanted to bring that to
the Court's attention that there were more allegations in the
direct-purchasers' complaint regarding NTN and the linkage
being demanded by the defendants between activities that did
take place in Japan and affects in the United States.
                    Okay. Let's go back to Schaeffler.
         THE COURT:
         MR. HOESE:
                    Yes, Your Honor. Thank you for
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MR. HOESE: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you for indulging me.

Schaeffler AG -- well, let me start and say that

the question presented by Schaeffler's motion is whether it would be fair and just under the circumstances to exert personal jurisdiction over Schaeffler AG. We believe that we have presented enough facts or otherwise for the Court to find that Schaeffler AG is the alter ego of Schaeffler Group USA, or that there is sufficient contacts with the United States by Schaeffler AG, and in addition that the Calder effects test, which the Carrier decision pointed to, enhanced some of the -- or all of the facts that we have asserted that would allow the Court to take jurisdiction.

As I mentioned, given the circumstances that our burden because the Court is relying on written submissions is relatively slight, and I won't go through all of the standards which the Court has already set forth in its opinions, but the pleadings and the affidavits do have to be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and the Court should not weigh controverting assertions of the party seeking dismissal here, Schaeffler AG.

What the plaintiffs need to do at this stage is make out a prima facie case that the Court has jurisdiction, and we believe that we have.

As I mentioned before, the Schaeffler AG is at the top of this -- it is almost at the top of the pyramid but it is responsible as Mr. Rosenfeld, who was mentioned by Schaeffler's counsel, stated in his declaration, which we

attached as Exhibit 8 to our response, that Schaeffler AG is the management holding company covering the operating business of Schaeffler AG and its majority-owned subsidiary entities collectively called the Schaeffler Group, and we will get to him in a minute.

Among other things, Schaeffler files consolidated financial statements, and I'm not saying every time a company files consolidated financial statements it shows a level of control necessary for the Court to pierce the corporate veil, but here I think the rules that allowed Schaeffler to do that and which it has done for many years are indicia of control. These are IFRS-10 consolidated financial statement rules.

In order for a company to legally be able to consolidate or under the accounting rules consolidate the entities it controls it has to meet three tests. IFRS-10 further defines control as follows: An investigator, and that would be Schaeffler AG I believe in this circumstance because it is the one consolidating all of the financial statements, controls an investee if, and only if, all of the following elements are met, and the first one is power over the investee, that would be Schaeffler Group. The investor has existing rights that give it the ability to direct the relevant activities, and in parens, the activities that significantly affect the investee's return, which I read to mean that what it sells, who it sells to and so on. The

investor has to have exposure or rights to variable returns from its involvement with the investee.

And one of the affidavits -- and I don't understand this, Mr. Crowe said that no part of the revenue of Schaeffler Group USA goes to Schaeffler AG based upon the filing of the consolidated financial statements. I'm not sure how that can be true, but I am not -- it may be an intermediate company where it goes first, I don't know.

And three is the ability to use its power over the investee to affect the amount of the investors' returns.

Again, to me that says it can tell them what to do or what not to do in order it make more money, make less money, sell to this person, not sell to this person. So it's in effect it is Schaeffler and its other operating company are one entity operated by Schaeffler AG, and the Carrier court found that important.

Let me -- I think also that the declarations that

Schaeffler AG put in provide facts in addition to the ones

that we alleged about control and contacts that provide even

more evidence that we have presented a prima facie case.

What is admitted by Schaeffler AG? It indirectly owns

100 percent of Schaeffler Group USA's stock. That's been

considered a factor by courts in the 6th Circuit in trying to

determine if personal jurisdiction is appropriate.

Schaeffler AG says Schaeffler AG board members

occasionally travel to the United States to attend meetings and trade shows, but who travels here, how often they travel here, where do they go, what do they do, who do they meet? If they go to trade shows they are going to tell me that they never meet with a customer in the United States of a Schaeffler bearing? Maybe it is true, but we don't know and that's something we wouldn't be able to know until we took discovery.

It was touted that Schaeffler didn't provide some of the services that Leoni does, but Schaeffler AG in its declarations states that it provides a limited number of administrative services to Schaeffler Group USA, Inc. and the many other Schaeffler Group companies around the world including tax and legal coordination services, accounting coordination services in connection with the consolidated annual account of the Schaeffler Group, so they said it right in their declaration.

They then go on to say Schaeffler AG personnel occasionally visit the United States to provide these services. Again, who, how often, what services, are they paid for, how much, if not why not, we don't know yet.

Schaeffler AG board members -- this is Schaeffler telling us this -- have held positions on the board of directors of Schaeffler Group USA, Inc. For example,

Juergen Geissinger was on the Schaeffler Group USA board from

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2005 to 2013. He's the CEO of Schaeffler AG.
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     George F.W. Schaeffler, again, the son of the founder, is an
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     80-percent owner of the Schaeffler Group, was a
     Schaeffler Group USA board member from 1996 until 2010, and
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     he serves --
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                          But he wasn't on both of them at the
              THE COURT:
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     same time?
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              MR. HOESE: Well, he was on the board -- I'm sorry,
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                  If I could ask you to repeat your question?
     Your Honor.
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              THE COURT:
                           It wasn't simultaneously?
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              MR. HOESE:
                           I believe Mr. Geissinger and
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     Mr. Schaeffler were both on the Schaeffler Group USA board at
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     the same time; Mr. Geissinger was on from 2005 to 2013, and
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     George Schaeffler was on between 1996 and 2005, so -- excuse
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     me, 2010, so that's an overlap of five years.
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              Schaeffler AG provides corporate communication and
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     investor relation services for Schaeffler Group USA.
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     Schaeffler AG provides some, and this I'm taking from
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     Mr. Crowe's affidavit, some of -- by implication some of
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     SG USA's capital, and Schaeffler Group USA purchases some
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     supplies from Schaeffler AG.
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              Now, the -- Mr. Crowe's declaration was designed to
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     look at the factors set forth in the Alexander case, but the
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     Alexander case was -- again, it was a Michigan law -- it was
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     construing Michigan law about what was necessary, and my
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reading of the Michigan cases is that it is not necessarily the same as what is required under the law in federal court, that Michigan may be more limited in terms of allowing the exercise of personal jurisdiction.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HOESE: If I may, I wanted to mention, it was said that we made some mistakes in the complaint regarding crossover of officers, Mr. Rosenfeld for one. Again, I'm not saying everything on the Internet is true by any stretch of the imagination but there was backup for all of the allegations that were made and there was a -- just to defend our honor, a -- let me see -- oh, something called Inside View listed Klaus Rosenfeld as the CEO of the Schaeffler AG, that's the basis for that allegation. They claim it is untrue, but at this stage we don't know yet, we haven't spoken to Mr. Rosenfeld.

With respect to Mr. Geissinger where we said that he was the CEO of Schaeffler AG and Schaeffler Group USA, that was part of the executive profile and biography that was put up by Business Week. So, again, these weren't allegations that were just pulled out of thin air, there was a basis for making these allegations, and at this point I believe under the standards that the Court isn't to weigh which one is accurate or which one isn't.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. HOESE:
                     So I think based upon the allegations
that we made in the complaint regarding control,
participation in the conspiracy by Schaeffler AG, which seems
to be borne out by the EC decisions so far, that we have
presented a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction over
Schaeffler AG.
         THE COURT:
                    Thank you.
         MR. HOESE: Thank you very much, Your Honor.
         THE COURT:
                    Reply?
         MR. MAHR:
                    Just three points, Your Honor.
         First, on the 12(b)(6) I just wanted to make clear
that the EC decision press release clarifies that the conduct
there involves specific RFQs in Europe for European
customers, so it is not so easy to make this jump to the
United States.
         As the elevators case said, you have to have
adequate allegations that the transactions or the RFQs in
Europe had effects here in the United States. You just can't
say that because they did it over there they must have done
it over here.
         Second point with respect to the EC press release,
I just want to emphasize it has nothing at all to do with
personal jurisdiction over Schaeffler AG.
Schaeffler AG may or may not have done in Europe doesn't
enhance its minimum contacts with the United States as a
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jurisdiction.

You already have ruled that there is not a conspiracy personal jurisdiction theory in the 6th Circuit, you held that in the S-Y Europe case, and that all it would go to and there is just no such theory.

Also, that the fact of the EC press release doesn't distinguish Schaeffler AG from Leoni AG or from S-Y Europe, your previous dismissals on personal jurisdiction grounds, because in both of those cases there were also press releases and also findings by the European Commission under the very same settlement procedures that those companies had engaged in conduct in Europe. That didn't change the minimum contacts analysis in the United States.

And finally with respect to the various 12(b)(2) arguments by Mr. Hoese, again, nothing he said distinguishes in any way Schaeffler AG from Leoni AG or from S-Y Europe. Holding yourself out as a corporate family to the public doesn't mean that your holding company has minimum contacts to the United States.

And the idea -- I think he said -- I haven't seen this in a complaint, I haven't seen this in an affidavit, but he said that Schaeffler USA imports bearings while at the same time manufacturing them here. If it imports bearings from Europe it doesn't import them from Schaeffler AG because Schaeffler AG doesn't make any bearings that it would be able

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to import.
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I think what Mr. Hoese is trying to do is put together kind of a personal jurisdiction stew where you take a little here, take a little there, take some from this company and some from this company, take a little from this press release and that press release. That's not the standard. The standard after a properly supported Rule 12(b)(2) motion, which we have filed, is laid out clearly in the Carrier case and the Tennyson case, and it requires plaintiffs to come forth with specific facts in affidavits or otherwise and they just haven't done that. That's all I have.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. All right. NSK?

MS. TOWEILL: Thank you, Your Honor. My name is Teale Toweill. I'm here on behalf of NSK Americas, Inc.

We also have a 12(b)(6) Twombly motion. You have the papers in front of you. I do agree that Mr. Kessler has pretty vigorously argued the relative paucity of the allegations in the three complaints, but there are a few points I would like to quickly make.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. TOWEILL: Mr. Kessler noted that in the opposition filed by the plaintiffs, pages one through three list their various allegations that they claim are sufficient

to support their pleading burden under Twombly. We actually

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     have pages three through nine, which I don't know is a good
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     thing or a bad thing but --
                           It's a good thing I read all the pages.
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              THE COURT:
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              MS. TOWEILL:
                             Sorry?
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                          I said it's a good thing I read all the
              THE COURT:
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     pages.
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              MS. TOWEILL: Good thing you read all the pages.
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     Well, you can read all of these pages, that's fine, because
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     as it turns out pretty much none of these are allegations as
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     to NSK Americas specifically. The allegations as to
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     NSK Americas are very limited, they relate to corporate form,
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     NSK Americas' relation to NSK, Ltd., its parent company in
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     Japan.
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              Two of the three complaints, the dealership and
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     end-payor complaints, note that there were two executives who
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     at one point worked at NSK Americas and at some point left
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     their employment there and subsequently took positions at
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                The third complaint, the direct-purchaser
     NSK, Ltd.
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     complaint, makes the same shadow management team allegation,
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     the exact contours of which are somewhat unclear, and
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     otherwise plaintiffs seek to rely instead on allegations that
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     don't name NSK Americas at all.
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              So setting aside the allegations as to NSK Americas
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     specifically, which I think we can all sort of agree don't
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create antitrust liability alone, so plaintiffs have two separate arguments as to why NSK Americas should still be considered a plausible member of this conspiracy as required by Twombly.

The first is their reliance on generic allegations as to defendants as a group. There are sort of two problems -- well, one and-a-half problems with this particular reliance. First, the end payors, and I will acknowledge this is an argument as to form, not to substance, but the end payors did, in fact, define defendants not to include NSK Americas, so at least insofar as we are talking about the end-payor complaints all of their allegations as to defendants generically can't as a matter of definition go to NSK Americas' conduct, but regardless the 6th Circuit has already rejected the idea that allegations as to defendants as a group can satisfy alone the plaintiffs' pleading burdens under Twombly, I think, so Total Benefits Planning Agency, which was decided by the 6th Circuit in 2008, held, and I quote, generic pleading alleging misconduct against defendants without specifics as to the role each played in the alleged conspiracy was specifically rejected by Twombly.

Carrier Corp. is a 2012 6th Circuit case that was previously discussed held the same thing, that the pleadings -- or the complaint must specify how each defendant was involved in the alleged conspiracy. Generic

complaints -- or generic allegations as to defendants simply don't satisfy that standard.

So if we set aside everything that just says defendants what we have left is a series of allegations as to entities that are not NSK Americas, and to sort of deal with these what the plaintiffs try to do is claim that NSK Americas is, in fact, an alter ego of NSK, Ltd. such that any wrongdoing alleged as to NSK, Ltd. can be imputed to NSK Americas, and they do this by going through a litany of statements regarding foreign proceedings as to NSK, Ltd. in Japan, in Singapore and other Asian jurisdictions.

They might, although they didn't at the time, reference the EC press release that is now under consideration by the Court, but none of those -- none of those pleadings have anything to do with NSK Americas in the first instance, these are all allegations as to conduct that took place in foreign jurisdictions by an entity that was not NSK, Ltd.

To sort of get through this alter-ego path the plaintiffs rely actually on this Court's decision in GS Electech, which was one of the wire harness decisions, and we don't disagree with that reliance, but what we do disagree with is the plaintiffs' sort of cavalier disregard of what that decision actually said. So what Your Honor said in GS Electech is that the evidence -- and this is a quote, the

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evidence must show that there is such a complete identity between the defendant and the corporation as to suggest that one was simply the alter ego of another. Complete identity. In GS Electech you did find that the alter-ego test had been satisfied, and in doing so you relied on Carrier Corp., the 2012 6th Circuit decision, but Carrier Corp. had a panoply of allegations going far beyond anything that happened here to support the idea of alter ego.

Here we have statements about corporate forum, the shadow-management structure, two people who once worked at the U.S. subsidiary and then subsequently worked at the Japanese parent company, and that is it. That is far from sufficient to show that there was a complete identity between NSK Americas and NSK, Ltd. such that the wrongdoing alleged against NSK, Ltd. in these complaints can be imputed to NSK Americas. They simply haven't satisfied the test that this Court said was the relevant test, and that leaves us with nothing. That leaves us with a statement that NSK Americas is a Delaware corporation, it is engaged in the business of selling bearings, it is owned by a Japanese corporation against whom allegations have been made, and a couple guys worked there and then worked somewhere else, and none of those facts even taken as a whole can be sufficient to support a finding that NSK Americas plausibly participated in the alleged conspiracy, and for that reason we think

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     NSK Americas should be dismissed.
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              THE COURT: Thank you.
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              MR. FREY: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
     Brendan Frey, counsel from Mantese, Honigman, Roseman &
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     Williamson, P.C., counsel for the auto dealers.
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               I will be arguing in opposition to NSK Americas'
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     motion on behalf of directs and end payors as well.
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              THE COURT: How do you spell your last name?
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              MR. FREY:
                          Frey, F-R-E-Y.
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              THE COURT:
                           Thank you.
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              MR. FREY:
                          Your Honor, there is an often-quoted
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     statement from Twombly which I am sure the Court is familiar
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     with.
            It provides that even if the allegations in the
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     complaint might strike a savvy judge as unlikely to lead to
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     the discovery of supporting evidence, and is improbable, the
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     complaint may proceed as long as the allegations contain
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     enough facts to be plausible.
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              And NSK Americas tries to turn the standard on its
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            NSK Americas is the wholly-owned subsidiary of
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     NSK, Ltd. NSK, Ltd. has admitted to or have been found to
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     have been fixing the price of bearings around the world.
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     Mr. Davidow explained, it is very unlikely that NSK, Ltd.
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     would have fixed the price of bearings for over a decade
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     without -- while at the same time allowing its wholly-owned
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     subsidiary to undercut the price fix in the United States by
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selling bearings at whatever price it wanted to sell them.

NSK Americas' culpability is not only plausible, it is probable, or as Mr. Davidow said, it is implausible that NSK Americas would not have been involved in the conspiracy aimed at the United States.

Plaintiffs sufficiently allege NSK Americas' involvement in the conspiracy. Plaintiffs allege that defendants conspired to fix the price of bearings sold in the United States. NSK Americas raises a concern about the end-payor complaint because there was one paragraph that did not include NSK Americas, but the rest of the complaint when viewed as a whole it clearly said that all defendants in their allegations and NSK Americas is clearly listed as a defendant in the complaint.

End payors have requested if necessary to make that more explicit if the Court deems it necessary, but they do not believe it is necessary to do so because when the complaint is read as a whole NSK Americas is clearly included in the allegations relating to the defendants.

NSK sold price-fixed bearings through its subsidiaries in the United States. NSK Americas manufactured, marketed and sold price-fixed bearings in the United States under control and direction of NSK, Ltd., and NSK, Ltd. is an admitted global price fixer of bearings and has been fined 380 million Yen in Japan where the Tokyo

District Court held that NSK carried out the central role in the cartel. NSK has been ordered to pay a fine in Canada for fixing the price of bearings. Just last week Singapore's competition authority announced a fine against NSK and its subsidiary in Singapore for collusive conduct relating to bearings. NSK has agreed to plead guilty to price fixing bearings in Europe and to pay a fine of over 62 million Euro, and NSK has agreed to plead guilty to fixing prices of bearings sold in the United States from 2000 -- from at least 2000 to 2011 and has agreed to pay a fine of \$68.2 million.

The plea agreement with the Department of Justice further provides that it requires the cooperation of NSK's subsidiaries and provides the United States will not bring further criminal charges against NSK or its related entities for any offense related to this bearings price-fixing conspiracy.

As Your Honor held in the GS Electech opinion and order, which defendants state they admit is right on point, this plea agreement creates an inference supporting NSK Ltd.'s control of NSK Americas. NSK Americas' participation is not only plausible, it is probable.

There are additional factors supporting NSK's control of NSK Americas. NSK Ltd.'s annual report includes aggregate financials for all of the NSK entities, it is reported by sector such as the automotive sector, it is not

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separate by subsidiaries.
                          NSK, Ltd. and NSK Americas have
shared numerous executives. NSK's subsidiaries around the
globe have been investigated and fined in connection with
bearings price-fixing conspiracy. NSK's subsidiary in Europe
was inspected by the European Commission. NSK's subsidiary
in South Korea was inspected by the Cree of Fair Trade
Commission.
         THE COURT: Slow down.
                    Sorry. So I think I said Europe,
         MR. FREY:
South Korea, Singapore, I already mentioned the subsidiary
was fined, and plaintiffs' complaint also cites the quarterly
report from prior to the NSK's quilty plea where the report
provided that NSK's subsidiary in the United States received
a subpoena in connection with U.S. Department of Justice
price-fixing investigation, and they raise an issue with this
saying it is not specific enough to be directed to
NSK Americas but the allegation is that its subsidiary in the
United States received the subpoena, not one of its
              NSK Americas is the only NSK entity listed in
subsidiaries.
the complaint.
         THE COURT:
                    Okay.
                    So -- and then further notably
         MR. FREY:
NSK Americas' receipt of the subpoena was followed by
NSK Ltd.'s quilty plea, which included a non-cooperation
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agreement in exchange for NSK Americas' cooperation.

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NSK Americas' participation is not only plausible, it is
probable.
           And the defendants don't like it when we say this
but I think it is worth repeating, the Court has heard these
arguments before in wire harness, and as ruled in Tokai Rika
and TRAM's motion to dismiss and GS Electech's motion to
          And the Court's opinion in wire harness -- opinions
are supported by the Carrier case. And plaintiffs'
allegations in this case are consistent with allegations that
were made in the Carrier Corp. case.
         The 6th Circuit in Carrier referenced the fact that
plaintiffs allege that the price-fixed product has been sold
in the United States through the subsidiaries, and that there
have been an overlap of executives between the subsidiaries
and the parent company.
                         Those allegations are consistent
with allegations in this case.
         THE COURT:
                     Okay.
         MR. FREY:
                    Thank you.
         THE COURT:
                     Reply?
         MS. TOWEILL: Just a few hopefully brief and not
too quickly spoken points for Your Honor.
         First, just to be clear, our issue with the
end-payor complaints is not that there is one paragraph that
does not include NSK Americas, it is that paragraph four of
the end-payor complaint which, in fact, defines the proper
noun defendants does not reference NSK Americas as one of the
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defendants so defined. It's unclear why they would bother to define the word defendants if it was meant to be inconclusive rather than exclusive as they claim in their reply.

And further, although they've made in their reply a brief mention of the possibility of amendment should the Court require it necessary, and have made a passing request to do the same now, I would note that that is not a proper request for leave to amend, and if they do file such a request we will, of course, respond.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. TOWEILL: Now, as to all of these proceedings that were just listed, the European proceeding, the Singapore proceeding, the South Korean proceeding, the JFTC proceedings, some of which apparently included findings as to subsidiaries of NSK, Ltd., the point is that none of those included any findings as to NSK Americas and none of those included any findings as to conduct in America, so unless this Court finds that NSK Americas is an alter ego of NSK, Ltd. all of that is irrelevant.

And for that test, the test of alter ego, what we are looking for again is complete identity, and we've heard that the allegations in these complaints are consistent with the allegations in the Carrier Corp. case, and it is certainly the case that the allegations made here also showed up in the Carrier Corp. case, but I think what plaintiffs are

sort of disregarding is that many, many, many other allegations also showed up in the Carrier Corp. complaint that was not here -- that were not made here.

We have briefed these and I won't waste the Court's time going through them, but one in particular that the plaintiffs seem particularly interested in is this idea of personnel having worked at both the parent and the subsidiary corporation. Here they have alleged, as I said before, two employees of NSK Americas at some point left NSK Americas and subsequently took up positions at NSK, Ltd.

In Carrier Corp. the allegation was that key managerial personnel rotated between the various subsidiaries on a schedule to ensure complete control and consistent control of those entities. That promotion in one entity was practically impossible unless you had rotated through one of the other entities. And in Carrier Corp. the court had the benefit of a finding by the European Commission that at least the European Finnish subsidiary of the parent corporation had no separate corporate identity, it was functionally the same company. None of those allegations are here.

So while the things they have said were also said in Carrier Corp., I think they are pretty dramatically overlooking the things that have not been said.

And then just one final point, all of these -- these litany of allegations about NSK, Ltd., which may or may

not be sort of borne out in the long run, NSK, Ltd. is a defendant in this case and NSK, Ltd. is not making a 12(b)(6) motion. NSK, Ltd. is not challenging the sufficiency of these allegations. It is NSK Americas, a separate U.S. subsidiary, to which essentially no argument has been made, and I think it is important to note that the Court keep in mind that there is still plenty of fodder for those NSK, Ltd. allegations even if this motion is granted because NSK, Ltd. is a completely separate company.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. TOWEILL: If I could just add one more point?

I'm glad I didn't number them at the beginning because I

would have miscounted.

They have made mention of the NSK, Ltd. plea agreement, and I would just like to note two things as to that plea agreement. One, as seems to be a theme here, the plea agreement relates to NSK, Ltd. and not to NSK Americas. NSK Americas is not named. The plea agreement does require cooperation of subsidiaries of NSK, Ltd., but NSK Americas agreeing to cooperating with the DOJ in return for non-prosecution seems to me equally plausibly explained as an independent business decision by a company that would rather not be prosecuted by the DOJ regardless of whether or not its parent company had the authority to control or direct such compliance. So relying on that as a way to sort of define

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alter ego seems inconsistent with the actual terms of the
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     plea.
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               THE COURT:
                           Thank you.
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              MS. TOWEILL:
                             Thank you.
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               MR. FREY:
                          May I have a brief sur rebuttal?
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                           All right.
               THE COURT:
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               MR. FREY:
                          Thank you, Your Honor.
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               NSK Americas acknowledges that the allegations in
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     our complaint are equally plausible to what they counter as
     some other scenario. We only need to meet the plausibility
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     test.
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               I also want to point out that the Carrier Corp.
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     statement that they tried to make hay of because Carrier
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     Corp. does trace very similar allegations that are in our
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     complaint, and then it does have a statement more importantly
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     about some other allegations which are also consistent with
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     our complaint, but the more important part of that, in
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     Carrier Corp. there was a finding of a conspiracy in Europe
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     and the plaintiffs were trying to connect that to the
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     United States.
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               Here we are already in the United States, NSK, Ltd.
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     has already pled guilty to fixing the price of bearings in
23
     the United States, and it is implausible that NSK Americas
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     would not have been involved in that price-fixing conspiracy
25
     aimed at the United States.
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THE COURT:

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Thank you, Mr. Frey.

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               MR. FREY:
                          Thank you.
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               MS. ROMANENKO: Your Honor, Victoria Romanenko.
               On behalf of auto dealers and end payors, we would
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     like to request Your Honor to reconsider Mr. Kessler's
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     request for a supplemental briefing.
                                            The defendants could
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     have raised the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
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     argument in their motion to dismiss and they didn't do that
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     because they felt that they didn't have the legal support to
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             Now they are trying to get a --
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                           Is he here?
               THE COURT:
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               UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: No, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: I can't consider this motion, he's
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     already left.
15
              MS. ROMANENKO:
                               He's left?
16
               THE COURT:
                           Yes. Too late.
17
               MS. ROMANENKO:
                               Okav.
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               THE COURT:
                           It is brief.
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               MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, I have one last thing
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                I promised one of the defense counsel, he had
     actually.
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     raised a concern that in the brief on coordination as to the
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     deferred defendants, and I listed the guilty pleaders and I
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     just said Mitsubishi, that he wanted me to make clear that it
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     is Mitsubishi Heavy Industries which was the signatory to
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     that brief and not Mitsubishi Electronics, which is part of
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one of the other briefs, and he just asked me to clarify that
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     on the record.
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               THE COURT: All right. That's noted for the
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     record.
              Thank you.
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               Anything else?
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               (No response.)
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               THE COURT:
                           Well, thank you all very much. We will
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     see you in October if not before -- oh, wait a minute.
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               MR. FEENEY: We have OSS, Your Honor, one motion.
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               THE COURT:
                          We have one motion left?
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               MR. FEENEY: On OSS, not bearings.
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                           I thought those were all waived?
               THE COURT:
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               MR. FEENEY: Not with respect to TRW Automotive
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     Holdings' motion to dismiss the direct-purchaser complaint.
15
               James Feeney on behalf of TRW Automotive.
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               THE COURT:
                          Okay. I'm going to ask you to do a
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     very brief argument, Counsel, because we thought it was
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     waived and I --
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               MR. FEENEY: That's fine, Your Honor.
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                           Is your opponent here?
               THE COURT:
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               MR. HANSEL: Yes, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT:
                           I just wanted to make sure.
23
               MR. FEENEY: Mr. Kessler is on the other side, Your
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     Honor, my side.
25
               Your Honor, for the record, James Feeney appearing
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on behalf of TRW Automotives.

As the Court heard this morning, TRW Automotive
Holdings and TRW Deutschland have entered into a settlement
agreement with the end payors and the auto dealers. They
have not settled, however, with the direct purchasers, which
gives rise to the pendency of this motion only as it relates
to TRW Automotive Holdings only as it relates to the
direct-purchaser complaint.

And I'm sure the Court -- I know the Court has read the briefs and is familiar with the argument, and you have heard a good deal of argument this morning about parents and subsidiaries, but I would like to spend just a couple minutes, Your Honor, highlighting for the Court why this complaint directed against TRW Automotive Holdings, which is a holding company, which has -- does not sell any OSS products that are part of the alleged cartel, does not manufacture any products, there are no allegations of overlapping executives, there are no allegations of meetings occurring at TRW Automotive Holdings, there are no allegations of any participation direct and independent by TRW Automotive Holdings.

The plea agreement that was entered involved a German subsidiary, an indirect subsidiary, TRW Deutschland.

TRW Deutschland operates independently in Germany. The cartel that was the subject of the plea agreement involved

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German-based conduct according to the plea agreement directed
to two German manufacturers. No allegations were made, no
mention was made, no statement was made about TRW Automotive
Holdings participating in any way in this conduct, and unless
the Court is prepared to adopt as a standard that simply
because a parent is sued and a subsidiary -- an indirect
subsidiary, for that matter, pleads quilty, that that is
sufficient to create the plausibility of conspiratorial
conduct by the parent, notwithstanding the absence of any
specific factual allegations involving the parent, then that
would articulate a standard that has not been previously
adopted either by this Court or the 6th Circuit, nor is it a
standard that is recognized under Michigan law involving
piercing the corporate veil.
         There has to be, as the Court -- as other counsel
has pointed out, complete identity, there is no allegation of
       There is no allegation of any wrongdoing specifically
directed to Automotive Holdings.
                                  The statements that are
made are made in a conclusory fashion, Your Honor.
really amount to a statement that rises to the level of
essential strict liability.
         THE COURT:
                     Okay.
                            Thank you.
                      Thank you.
         MR. FEENEY:
         MR. HANSEL: Good afternoon, again, Your Honor,
Greg Hansel for the direct-purchaser plaintiffs.
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TRW Automotive's motion to dismiss should be denied for three reasons. First, the Court has already denied other motions to dismiss in the wire harness case based on the same issue that TRW Automotive is raising. Second, TRW -- the OSS direct-purchaser plaintiffs have pled a plausible claim against TRW Automotive because TRW Automotive is the American connection for TRW Deutschland who pled guilty. Third, on the veil-piercing issue, federal corporate law does allow piercing the veil where the corporate form is used to commit antitrust violations.

I know the Court wants to be brief so I have slashed and burned most of my argument. I will try to be as quick as possible.

Operative allegations in the complaint include that TRW Automotive Holdings is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in Livonia, Michigan. TRW Deutschland Holding, also a holding company, but that doesn't seem to bother TRW in this case, pled guilty to price fixing in occupant safety systems and agreed to pay a \$5.1 million fine -- criminal fine in the United States.

The complaint alleges TRW Automotive wholly owned TRW Deutschland, controlled it, directed it, and directly or through subsidiaries manufactured, marketed and sold OSS products purchased in the United States. Plaintiffs allege TRW Automotive was an active, knowing participant in the

conspiracy, that it knew, approved of, authorized, ordered and condoned the acts of TRW Deutschland, that the DOJ subpoenaed TRW Automotive directly first in the United States even before the EC visited TRW Deutschland in Europe, and that TRW Automotive as a whole has 20 percent of the OSS market globally.

The other defendants in this case, the other groups, are Tokai Rika, Takata and AutoLiv, and together with TRW they control 73 percent of the global market for OSS products.

There are four defendant groups in this case, and of those four TRW Deutschland has pled guilty, Takata has pled guilty, AutoLiv has pled guilty as did its employee, Takayoshi Matsunaga, and Tokai Rika, the fourth defendant, has pled guilty to other products, heater control panels, as well as to obstruction of justice. Tokai Rika's former employee, Hitoshi Hirano, was indicted on May 22nd, 2014 for price fixing in heater control panels and obstruction of justice, destroying and ordering destruction of documents.

The rulings that the Court has made before that apply here very briefly are the ruling that on Tokai Rika and TRAM's motion to dismiss in the wire harness case, which is Docket No. 74-10, there as here the plaintiffs sued two corporate affiliates, a parent and an alleged wholly-owned and controlled subsidiary. There as here, one affiliate had

pled guilty, the other had not.

Quoting briefly from Your Honor's opinion, the
District Court should not dismember the complaint. The
complaints notify TRAM and Tokai Rika what wrongdoing they
are alleged to have committed. Tokai Rika's guilty plea does
not establish immutable boundaries for civil cases because
guilty pleas are negotiated. The Court finds the complaints
sufficiently allege an agency relationship that the
activities of TRAM were under the direction and control of
defendant Tokai Rika. Plaintiffs have alleged that TRAM was
wholly owned and controlled by Tokai Rika and have met their
pleading burden. There is further support of the
relationship inasmuch as Tokai Rika pleaded guilty to conduct
that occurred at TRAM.

Here in OSS, plaintiffs' case is even stronger because TRW Deutschland pled guilty to price fixing in the same product, OSS products, whereas in Tokai Rika's case it was a different product, it was heater control panels, but it was kept in the wire harness cases.

The second point, we all remember the great classic movie The French Connection. What was the American connection here between TRW Deutschland, which counsel has argued is an independent subsidiary, if there is such a thing, an independent subsidiary in Germany, what is their connection with the U.S. market such that they would plead

guilty to price fixing in the United States? The answer is their American connection is TRW Automotive.

What is -- so the Sherman Act only reaches conduct that affects the United States. TRW Deutschland has no office in the United States, it only operates here through TRW Automotive, which has 28 locations in the United States and its headquarters down the road in Livonia. So TRW Automotive has consolidated financials, the annual report cited by the defendants in their brief does not even mention TRW Deutschland, and the financials are consolidated.

What TRW entity did the Department of Justice investigate in the United States? DOJ subpoenaed TRW Automotive and did so before the EC investigation in Europe, so that order is significant.

And what role does TRW Automotive play in the global TRW group? Well, it plays a dominant role. As the Court stated in the GS Electech motion denying the motion to dismiss, allegations of dominance may, quote, create an inference, end of quote, that multiple entities, quote, participated in the conspiracy.

To hear TRW tell it, TRW Automotive doesn't make or sell anything. Well, this may come as news to the well-compensated senior executives of TRW Automotive in Livonia, including the executive vice president of manufacturing and operations at TRW Automotive, I guess he

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has nothing to do.
                    The executive vice president of sales at
TRW Automotive, who I guess has a no-show job also, and the
executive vice president and CFO who must not be involved in
finance and pricing. What do these three executives do all
day in Livonia?
         TRW Automotive is the parent and sole owner of
TRW Deutschland. It owned and controlled and dominated it.
It is not plausible that in the backyard in America of its
dominant parent TRW Deutschland could participate in a
price-fixing conspiracy without its knowledge.
         Finally, on the veil piercing, Your Honor, we
briefed it, I won't belabor it, but under federal common law
there is a lower standard than under state veil-piercing law
where there is an allegation that a corporation has used a
subsidiary to violate the antitrust laws. We have fully
             The Court has also addressed that in the
briefed it.
GS Electech and the TRAM and Tokai Rika cases. There is one
more case which I provided to counsel this morning which
cites a case that TRW cites in its brief, the TFT LCD case.
         THE COURT:
                     The what?
         MR. HANSEL: If I may, this case I'm referring to
now is called the Marine Hose Antitrust Litigation.
                                                     If I may
approach I have a copy for the Court?
         THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
         MR. HANSEL: Very similar facts to this.
                                                   It was an
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antitrust class-action MDL. The court had found already that
one entity, a subsidiary called ITR, that the allegations
against ITR had been sufficient. This is a Southern District
           But the plaintiffs were also suing the parent
of Florida.
company of ITR called SAIAG, and SAIAG'S parent Cumital
       And the court ruled that the allegations were
sufficient to sustain the complaint against all three
entities, the parent and the ultimate parent, and held
plaintiff need not differentiate between related corporate
entities.
         For those reasons, Your Honor, direct-purchaser
plaintiffs in OSS respectfully ask the Court to deny
TRW Automotive's motion to dismiss. Thank you.
         THE COURT:
                     Thank you.
         MR. FEENEY: Very briefly, Your Honor but
importantly?
         THE COURT:
                     Okay.
         MR. FEENEY: Point number one, Your Honor, with
regard to the wire harness opinions, in wire harness, in TR,
the parent pled guilty to conduct that took place at its
             There is no allegation of that in this case
subsidiary.
because they cannot make that allegation. Here the parent
did not plead guilty to anything and the subsidiary -- the
indirect subsidiary pled quilty to conduct occurring in
Germany, not in the United States, in terms of the cartel
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activity.

Point number two, with regard to the GSE case, the parent was alleged to have sold price-fixed products through its U.S. subsidiaries. Again, that did not occur and there is no allegation that that occurred in this case. The price-fixed products that are the subject of the plea agreement and the guilty plea entered by TRW Deutschland were sold to German manufacturers -- German manufacturers in Germany, they made their way into the United States. That is the American connection. It has nothing to do with what three executives in Livonia are doing on daily basis. There is no allegation in the complaint to the contrary, and for counsel to suggest that it is different ignores the plea agreement and ignores the allegation -- the allegations in their own complaint.

I would invite the Court to simply look at page four -- pages four and five of our reply brief where we outline every one of these allegations that is made, and the Court will see upon scrutiny that none of these specifically involve conduct occurring at or by TRW Automotive.

Finally, Your Honor, the last time I checked
Michigan law applies, and the case law is clear on that with
regard to the alter-ego issue. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. KINGSLEY: Your Honor, Meredith Kingsley on

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     behalf of the AutoLiv defendants. I was admitted and sworn
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     this morning, so those papers should be before you.
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               Just very briefly in light of AutoLiv's
 4
     settlements, I wanted to make the Court aware they should be
 5
     expecting papers by which AutoLiv can withdraw from the
 6
     pending motions to dismiss in all the class actions that
 7
     pending against us without prejudice to be reasserted later
 8
     if the settlements don't go forward.
 9
               THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
10
               MS. KINGSLEY: Thank you, Your Honor.
11
               THE COURT: I'm going to ask, anything else?
12
               (No response.)
13
               THE COURT: That's it. Thank you all.
14
               ATTORNEYS: (Collectively) Thank you, Your Honor.
15
               THE COURT: Have a good summer working.
16
               (Proceedings concluded at 1:45 p.m.)
17
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1	CERTIFICATION
2	
3	I, Robert L. Smith, Official Court Reporter of
4	the United States District Court, Eastern District of
5	Michigan, appointed pursuant to the provisions of Title 28,
6	United States Code, Section 753, do hereby certify that the
7	foregoing pages comprise a full, true and correct transcript
8	taken in the matter of IN RE: AUTOMOTIVE PARTS ANTITRUST
9	LITIGATION, Case No. 12-02311, on Wednesday, June 4, 2014.
10	
11	
12	s/Robert L. Smith Robert L. Smith, RPR, CSR 5098
13	Federal Official Court Reporter United States District Court
14	Eastern District of Michigan
15	
16	
17	Date: 06/12/2014
18	Detroit, Michigan
19	
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